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In their overview of the Belgian national electoral results and party systems since 1830, Matagne and Verjans 
(2012:85) concluded that Belgium advanced from a bipolar political system since 1848, via what Giovanni 
Sartori (1976) called a two-and-a-half party system in the 1920s to the fractionalized and highly volatile 
multiparty system that present-day Belgium is worldwide known for. In this paper we study the linkages 
between the changing political system, the process of electoral reforms and the development of the party 
system. We intend to do so focusing on an old democracy: Belgium. We analyze origin, rise and fall of 
Belgian political parties participating in the national legislative elections, of the nature and complexity and 
change of the national electoral system, of the persistence, consolidation and change of the national party 
system, and last but not least of the perception of democracy in itself.
2
 These issues are among the most central 
issues studied by political scientists.  
 
There are plenty of explanations for today‟s party system fragmentation. Ever since the 1960s political parties 
in Belgium, in The Netherlands and in many other Western European representative democracies were 
principally uprooting from social cleavages. In fact, both party fractionalization and electoral volatility have 
flared up together with the institutionalization of the pluralistic and multi-level Belgian political system back 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout the 1990s a combination of political scandalitis, corruption and general 
perceived failure in the field of policing or food quality control (Swenden et al. 2009:9) has left the bulk of 
Belgian voters as well as the international media aghast. Party ideologies have unmistakable converged 
(Andeweg 2012:366) therefore traditional parties compete more and more for the center of the political 
spectrum symbolized by „Joe average‟ the flanks at the far right and left are unlocked for new political 
initiatives. That process of the depillarization of the traditional Belgian polity was reinforced in the 1980s by 
very different processes, both sociological (i.e. secularization, individualization) and institutional (i.e. the state 
reforms which resulted in the regionalization of the national party system and the fact that political parties had 
become more dependent (for its funding) of the state
3
 and not of private support or contributions). As a 
consequence partisanship in the mid-1990s had dropped massively in most European democracy, including 
Belgium
4
 (ibid. 2012:361) and total electoral and party system volatility as well as political system instability 
had risen (Drummond 2006) to unseen levels. And despite the fact that the role and function of political parties 
are largely questioned, because this debate largely confuses the voter and the public opinion on the efficacy of 
the democratic institutions, it is still widely accepted that “[e]lections and parties are the key mechanisms of 
democracy, without stable parties, elections are weak reeds […].” (Lipset 2001:111)  
 
There are many reasons to study electoral systems, the electoral process and the electoral weight and strength 
of political parties. And the relative stability of political systems is certainly a good reason. However, in a 
healthy democracy “[p]olitical leadership needs to be renewed and elections provide a peaceful ritual by which 
this may be accomplished.” (Katz, Mair 1995:22) Because “(…)electoral systems “determine the means by 
which votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (Farrell 2001:4), electoral 
systems are at the core of the principle of democratic representation and therefore at the heart of the 
parliamentary game. (Bogdanor & Butler (1983:1) in: Pilet 2007:10 and Pilet 2012:419) One way for parties 
to adapt to the new societal conditions that for some observers like Peter Mair (2006) could lead to the failure 
of parties and the end of the party-based democratic representation as we currently know it, is therefore to 
change the electoral institution.  
 
In this article we give an overview of the electoral reforms that shaped Belgium‟s political system and we 
make an evaluation of how successful those reforms have been in terms of finding durable electoral equilibria, 
which are said to be the cornerstones of a sometimes more and sometimes less well-functioning democracy. 
 
                                                 
2 According to Schumpeter “[Representative democracy is] a system in which voters, the mass of the population, are able to choose 
between contending elites, that is, alternative candidates.” (Lipset 2001:111) What matters for the development of a party system is 
when a democracy was born, not how old it is (Mainwaring, Zoco 2007:155)., should we say a democracy that was born after World 
War I, hence with the introduction of the one man one vote electoral system in 1919, extended to all Belgians in 1948 (introduction of 
voting right for all 21-year old women)? 
3 According to Katz and Mair it is the state that “(…)provides contested elections. And since democratically contested elections, at 
least as currently understood, require political parties, the state also provides (…) political parties.” (1995:22) 
4 According to van Biezen, Mair & Poguntke only Spain seems to be the one new democracy where party membership (both in 
absolute and relative numbers) has grown almost uninterruptedly since the introduction of democracy. But the general conclusion is 
that political parties are no longer mass organizations that connect society to the political authorities. (2012:389-390) 
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2. Why the statistical historiographic approach? 
 
The reason for this study of the Belgian national electoral and party system however is of a more particular 
nature too. Apart from the above more general issue definitions this study also aims to meet three different 
more particular challenges. First of all, there have been several scientific attempts to bring together 
longitudinal datasets of detailed time series of election results, though the available data remain dispersed, 
sometimes incomplete, and often variable in quality. (Renard & Dodeigne 2012:545) Where publicly available 
and considered trustworthy, election data for certain periods in time (cf. 1831-1847, 1900-1919 and the inter-
bellum) nevertheless often show dissimilarities. Pre-1848 election results for the Belgian legislative are simply 
largely missing which explains why this period is relatively under-studied. Post-1945 election data in most of 
the Western democracies are widely available, making the modern age very interesting for (comparative) 
research. Bringing all the available data together in one dataset spanning the entire 1848-2010 period is an 
important effort on itself.
5
 By analyzing the dataset in a politicological, socio-historical and statistical way, we 
intend to add to the research-ability of Belgium‟s national electoral and party system.  
 
Secondly, the longitudinal statistical analysis of election data is largely missing and where available the nature 
is largely descriptive. For the reasons already mentioned, most studies are based on periodic analysis (pre-
WWI, post-WWII, post-1995). Most election studies discuss the outcome of one election or a rather a short 
period of elections. Lipset referred to the foremost developmental analytical and anecdotal approach as a 
(required) technique allowing primarily the contextualizing election outcomes (2001:111), using sociological 
and institutional determinants and looking at the consequences of change. In-depth or integrated historic 
studies of the institutional context (e.g. De Winter et al. 2009) that have molded the Belgian political and party 
system over a longer period of time combined with statistics that transcend the level of pure narrative and add 
to the analysis and interpretation of long-term evolutions or trends, are, however, very scarce. In 2012 a 
comprehensive study of the electoral systems in Belgium (1831-2010) was published by Frédéric Bouhon and 
Min Reuchamps, two Belgian professors of the University of Liège. This voluminous book titled Les systems 
électoraux de la Belgique  is a tremendous help for understanding the starting conditions and the further 
development of the electoral systems as well as for the comprehension of the relation between the evolution of 
the Belgian political, electoral and party system…, however,  studied by and large from a diachronic historic 
point of view. (cf. van Haute 2012:212) And the study is far from 100 percent exact in its data.
6
 In 2007 the 
Brussels professor Jean-Benoit Pilet did exactly the opposite and studied Les réformes des lois électorals en 
Belgique from a contemporary perspective. Attention is given in particular to three „ongoing‟ discussions (i.e. 
the return to the majoritarian system, the direct election of the mayor, and the devolution of the list vote). Pilet 
spends two chapters on the historic evolution of the electoral system(s) in Belgium –chapters that are well-
needed to understand the particularities of the present discussions. But the book does not present a statistical 
historiography of the national electoral and party system.  
 
More to it, in order to present a consistent historic evolution of the electoral system(s), political and electoral 
changes are mostly studied on an nationally aggregated party family level (i.e. comparing the electoral strength 
of the main ideologies, e.g. Catholicism, liberalism, socialism and other (nationalism, ultra-leftism, 
environmentalism)) or at a regional level (comparing Flanders with Brussels and Wallonia), or both (cf. 
Bouhon & Reuchamps). This approach too offers an opportunity for more thorough empirical evidencing and 
for more elaborated statistical research of the electoral history. With this article we seek to fill this gap by 
analyzing the electoral system changes and the election results of all politically relevant initiatives (thus 
electoral and parliamentary parties included) and based on a time series starting in 1876 (in total: 48 national 
elections). This includes both the study of the electoral strength of the party family or ideological group or 
faction at an aggregated country level as well as on the sub-group or fractional level (party fraction) and for 
instance in the case of the de-nationalized or regionalized parties at the individual party level at a regional 
level. The unit of analysis therefore is varying between the party family (e.g. the Catholic or Christian-
democratic, socialist, liberal, ecologist and the Flemish-nationalist parties
7
) and the party (including all 
                                                 
5 The election data (period 1847-2010) are collected in the online elections database of the FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 
(http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html) and checked against the data collected by Bouhon and Reuchamps‟ Les systems 
électoraux de la Belgique (2012:535-587). 
6 To give an example, when over viewing the number of directly eligible seats in the Chamber of Representatives the authors overlook 
the changes of the size of the parliament in the years 1919, 1925, 1936 and 1949. 
7 We draw the same line as drawn by Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009:10): the recent election results discussed are presented by 
party family, and not per party, because there are no country-wide parties any more. And though very different in the style, story and 
language the Flemish-nationalist party family includes the rather exclusive-nationalist Vlaams Belang (extreme right) and the 
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mainstream, traditional, modern or post-modern parties as well as the ultra-catholic parties, the libertarian or 
republican, or extreme left fractions).  
 
A third motive for the statistical historiographic approach relates to the fact that Belgium is often cited as the 
exception to the laws that explain the nature and causes of electoral institutions
8
 and of their reform as well as 
of the advancement of a national party system under a specific electoral system. Many such laws are based on 
cross-sectional multi-country (explanatory) or comparative analysis of election data. On the basis of such large 
datasets, it seemingly makes sense to classify democracies and party systems and categorize parties for 
instance in terms of their social cohesion, their ideology, their organization, party activity and many other 
useful variables. But, that way party (system) characteristics are aggregated to a higher (universal) level and 
“(…)testing systematically through a specified and substantial universe”,“[inevitably], the data used for these 
tests will vary in precision from hypothesis to hypothesis.” (Rose 1969:20) Therefore, tough conclusions 
drawn on tests based on large datasets of election data for several countries or regions may open a perspective 
on further generalizations to other comparable universes, it seldom becomes clear what the –generalized- 
outcomes in fact teach us about each single country… at each point of time (election or electoral reform). To 
cite the same author on one example: “Implicit in much sociological discussion of parties is the hypothesis that 
social groups give birth to political parties.” That conclusion –based on the central thesis that more diverse 
societies install an electoral system that allows for more democratic participation- could be derived quite easily 
from large multi-country databases with information on electoral participation and electoral results, however, -
so the author continues- “[the] statement is as implausible empirically as it is metaphorically unnatural” for 
“(…)the decision to found a party is always taken at the initiative of a small group of politicians, and not by 
mechanical market mechanisms.” (ibid.) In sum, the stronger the social cohesion of a political or party system, 
the stronger the demand-push dynamics for political representation of new societal groups. At the same time 
not all of the religion-based, class-based or community-related politicized initiatives have been successful or 
long lasting. Many societal groups have proven infertile, like the extreme fascist parties before the Second 
World War (WWII) or the new parties sprouting from wartime resistance activities after WWII was ended, or 
even the more recent libertarian parties
9
 that emerged in Flanders at the turn of the 21
st
 Century. Whereas one 
would expect that electoral strength of parties as well as elasticity of the party vote vary inversely with the 
party system‟s degree of cohesiveness, in some contexts (for instance at times of deep institutional, societal or 
economic crises) only the thematically and organizationally more flexible party lead by the especially skillful 
broker politicians
10
 may prove to be the more workable (cf. the resurrection of the People‟s Union (Volksunie) 
in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s and of its successor, the New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) in the 
period 2001-2012). Looking at a country‟s electoral history is fundamental for the study of the electoral 
policies of that country. Hence election research cannot do without looking at the broader context, at the 
legacies and the paths electoral reforms, party system dynamics and political choices were depending on. 
 
Thus, in our opinion the comparative multiple-country highly quantitative approach is highly problematic 
when it comes to single out ideas or findings that are relevant for one or the other particular country, not to 
mention that the relevance of the largely generalized conclusions lacks the widely accepted anticipated 
applicability at the level of the  individual party. We here purposely take a strong stand in putting in 
perspective the fact that social science-based theory does not state or explain everything about any particular 
case and that none of the individually observed objects or cases will possess all averaged characteristics or 
traits nor will it fit all imperatives or rules deducted from the theory. Nevertheless some (all) cases observed 
do to some extent. We therefore control for the fit of the Belgian case with the theory-based assumptions 
concerning democratic representation of parties, political inclusiveness of electoral systems, party system 
dynamism, and so on and so forth. But the task of testing a series of hypotheses concerning the variations in 
party support cannot be successfully completed when leaving the social context or the properties of the 
electoral institution and party system aside. (Rose, Urwin 1970:296) We thus perceive a clear added value in 
not only validating but also complementing the already existing comparative models of electoral and party 
                                                                                                                                                                    
inclusive-nationalist N-VA (right of the centre). Cf. Maddens, B. (15/10/2012). Kroniek van een aangekondigde nederlaag?, 
Opiniestuk, Deredactie.be. 
8 I.e. the electoral institution including electoral laws defining the size of the parliament, the electorate and the electoral district(s), the 
ballot structure and seat distribution mechanism, as well as those regulating the entire organization of elections, including the 
frequency and the number of re-electable seats. The electoral system focuses on those aspects that help the translation of the public 
vote into seats (i.e. the electoral formula) as well as the attribution of representative mandates to (elected) candidates. (Pilet 2007:10)  
9 For instance R.O.S.S.E.M., Liberaal Appél or VLOTT. 
10 Cf. Rose framing this problem as the classic trade-off between party management efficiency (of parties built upon class, religion…) 
and electoral success (of “heterogeneous parties capable of building coalitions of specific instrumental appeals”) (1969:22-23; 25). 
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system change with the in-depth statistical single case-based statistical historiography that we present here. To 
quote Pilet, the combination of detailed historically descriptive of election outcomes, the particular 
contextualization of the balance of power between the traditional ideologies and between individual parties 
and on top of that the systematic statistical verification of the theory of the effects of electoral system reforms 
at the national level is missing and is therefore strongly needed in the study of elections and electoral systems. 
(Pilet 2007:58) 
 
In order to allow any comparison with here referred mostly comparative research, parliamentary representation 
is studied based on the election results of party families (i.e. catholic, liberal, socialist, green, regionalist, 
extreme left, extreme right and even ultra liberal or catholic or libertarian ideologies) and thus at an aggregate 
level (i.e. the national party score is the sum of the regional party scores), the data used here include all 
publicly available election results at the national (federal) level. Comparable to Rose and Urwin‟s study “[the] 
chief measure is the aggregate vote for each party in each election for the major national legislative assembly”. 
A party‟s strength therefore is the percentage of votes, hence a continuous variable, and not its executive 
strength referring its participation in government or opposition. (1970:289-290) The analyses are not based on 
the election results at level of the region, the province, the arrondissement or the smallest constituency. 
 
Last but certainly not least, another important driver of this statistical historiography of Belgium‟s national 
electoral and party system, is that interest might drop in this line of research when the Belgian state is fully 
dismantled (read: de-federated), in casu as soon as the federal level is completely eroded. In view of the 
mother of elections of 2014 (when federal, regional and European elections are organized together) and the 
unpredictable outcome in terms of the perceived risk of a breakup of the Belgian state (a scenario that is 
considered at both sides of the language border), the timing of this study might prove strategic too. 
 
3. The evolution of Belgium‟s national electoral and party system 
 
In How party systems form Marcus Keuzer states that “(…)a founding election of a democracy does not take 
place in a historical vacuum. It is shaped by longterm historical legacies and short-term starting conditions. 
Such as prior factors affecting the effective number of electoral contestants.” (2009:676) “A founding election 
is the starting point in a process that may or may not lead to a country becoming an established democracy. It 
introduces an electoral system, encourages political elites to organize parties to compete for votes, and reveals 
what could previously only be guessed at: how much support different elites have among those eligible to 
vote.” (Rose 2000:104)  
 
In the case of Belgium, political life in the half century following the election of the first National Congress in 
November 1830 –thus even before the independence of Belgium was officially accepted by France and Great 
Britain-, was largely organized around and dominated by two opposing ideological groups: the oldest, the 
notables‟ Liberal party versus the younger clerical Catholic party. (van Haute 2012:212-213) Though the 
Liberal party was in itself heavily divided between doctrinaires and radicals right from the start, until the 
1880s Belgium de facto was a bipolar political system.
11
 In this system both liberal and catholic groups shared 
two concerns: firstly, the concern of protecting the wealth of primi inter pares
12
 and, secondly, the joint 
concern in opposing the Dutch sovereign Willem I. Both concerns had strongly allied both opposing 
ideoligical blocs into a monster alliance.  
 
The newborn empowered political elite (estimated to less than thousand men) of less than one thousand men 
was considered to be the only one being capable enough and eager enough to protect the state and its wealth 
and therefore entitled to exercise political rights and therefore stand for elections (= passive suffrage). At the 
time the National Congress counted 200 seats and included representatives of the nobility and the higher 
                                                 
11 In those early days it was already clear that the country was divided along a ideological line. The Congress represented four blocs: 
103 liberals, 94 Catholics, 33 Orangists  (= annexation of the Flemish province to The Nederlands) and 20 Reunionists (= annexation 
of the Walloon province to France). The Northern part of the country (East-Flanders and West Flanders) was largely clerical and 
harbored the majority of Orangists. The Southern part of Belgium (Liège and Henegouwen) was largely anti-clerical. The south was 
foremost inspired by Reunionists Those factions were also represented in the National Congress. To give an example, when the House 
of Orange-Nassau was excluded from the Belgian throne „forever and ever‟, 189 out of 200 votes were counted of which 28 
congressmen voted against and eleven abstained (Decree dd. 24 November 1830). The voting of a second Decree on the same issue 
clearly showed that the interest or the support to exclude the House of Orange-Nassau was diminishing (only 131 votes of which 98 
against and 2 abstentions) (Decree dd. 24 February 1831). Source: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationaal_Congres_(Belgi%C3%AB) 
12 That thin layer of wealthy and rich people represented the one percent.  
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bourgeoisie from all nine provinces (the average district magnitude was hence 200/9 = 22,22)
13
. The main task 
of the National Congress was to prepare a Constitution. After the adoption of the first Constitution in February 
1831, many of the congressmen were convinced that their role was outplayed, others were disappointed or 
frustrated, bored or not longer interested in being part of political life. Eventually, around one in five 
representatives were replaced.  
 
At the time the political elite spoke French throughout the country and French was therefore also the obvious 
choice as the language of government and public administration. (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:8) We will 
demonstrate in the next paragraphs that Belgium‟s democracy has changed in many ways: the right to vote 
was generalized, parties formalized, the electoral institution became more inclusive and the parliament more 
representative, voters became more self-aware as society increasingly turned more individualistic and 
politicians were gradually held more accountable
14
. Hence, Belgian‟s electoral history is characterized by 
change. However, there is one constancy, ever since the very first election of the national parliament, Belgian 
politics have incessantly been dominated by tensions stemming from the community- and identity related 
divide (call it nationalism).   
 
3.1 A tax-based electoral franchise and the polarization of a nation 
 
In 1831 somewhat like 46 thousand citizens owed the right to vote (= active suffrage). Overall franchise was 
around 1,13% of the total Belgian population.
15
 At the time of the introduction of the tax based electoral 
system or tax suffrage the parliament counted 108 seats being spread over 41 constituencies. There were 27 
multiple member districts  (MMDs) in which members of parliament were indirectly elected via the party lists. 
In those MMDs the election was based on a two-round system based on absolute majority. In the remaining 
fourteen single member districts (SMDs) candidates were elected directly, by simple majority (plurality).
16
 
However the heavy plurality character of the electoral system which in general leads to the overrepresentation 
and political supremacy of one party, until the formal organization of parties, until the acceptance of 
Belgium‟s independence by the Dutch King Willem I (1839: Treaty of the 24 articles), the liberals and 
Catholics systematically maintained their unionist strategy which lead to conjoint governing. Moreover, due to 
a conflict concerning the interpretation of the constitutionally anchored freedom of education, aka the first 
School Question, the 15 years old inter-party unionism eventually came to an end in 1846. The liberal radical 
and doctrinaire parliamentary groups –merely tied by a genuine anti-clericalism-  were the first to get formally 
organized. The Belgian Liberal party, officially the oldest party in Belgium, was born in 1846, lead by the 
Walloon Eugène Defacqz.
17
 Being confronted with a general economic crisis , mounting unemployment, and a 
life threatening food shortage the liberal prime minister Charles Rogier had to undertake swift measures.  
 
In order to calm the situation that followed the Spring of People of 1848, Karl Marx was expelled, the School 
Question was solved and the electoral system was reformed. Since that time the Belgian educational system 
would accommodate a network of public schools and a network of free schools run by the catholic church. 
Secondly, the parliament agrees to extend the tax-based electoral access or censitair system to a broader class 
of more or less four thousand aged men (25 years old), paying taxes (on houses and grounds), or having 
obtained a certain level of education. With 79 thousand voters the level of franchise reached 1,81% of the total 
Belgian population. The electoral reform however favored the (liberal) bourgeoisie and preluded the era of the 
Liberal hegemony. It is self-evident that the political elite of the 19
th
 century was largely united by descent, 
capital and language. That political elite formed a class on its own and in its own right. Nevertheless, the large 
majority of Belgians spoke no French (like the majority of the anti-clerical bourgeoisie) but Dutch (Flemish) 
                                                 
13 The National Congress held 98 representatives from Flanders, 75 from Wallonia and 27 from Brabant. East-Flanders was the largest 
province (35 seats) and the smallest was Namur (10 seats).  
14 Elections have always been a form of „electoral accountability‟, except when the National Congress was established, where 
accountability was not determined by the broader set of issues and tasks that the congressmen had to deal with, yet foremost concerned 
the writing of the Constitution at the shortest possible term. Since a great deal of Congressmen quitted their mandate when this task 
was accomplished, they couldn‟t be held accountable in the subsequent election of 1831, because they were not re-electable. Besides, 
as long as unionisme between the liberals and the Catholics ruled the Belgian polity and by virtue of a lack of control mechanisms the 
19th century politics in Belgium were largely characterized weak personal accountability. (Rose 2000:2)  
15 Cf. Stefano Bartolini‟s definition of franchise, i.e. the concept refers to “the right of suffrage, that is, to the legal definition of who is 
eligible to cast a ballot in a state.” (in Rose 2000:117) 
16
 As a consequence of the absolute majoritarian system in all multimember districts “[N]ul n‟est élu au premier tour de scrutiny s‟il ne 




(like most Catholics). History would prove that Flemings would seek an own future for their own language 
community.
18
 Resisting the French-speaking suppression in more than one layer of society was part of that 
ambition. However, one of the main stumbling blocks turned out to be the French-speaking Flemings that was 
a part of the Belgian local and national political elite. It would take another 50 years to solve that internal 
language divide (cf. infra: the Equality Law). Anyhow, from the 1848 elections onwards the Liberal party 
would aim to break into the catholic sphere of influence. And vice versa. 
 
In the years 1831-1848 the number of parliamentary seats followed the growth of the population (102 in 1831 
versus 108 in 1848) and the biggest electoral districts were further enlarged.  
 
3.2  Party formalization and the birth of the two-and-a-half party system 
 
The formal organization of the Catholic factions into one united conservative and unitaristic-Belgian Catholic 
party under the leadership of Charles Woeste (1869) deepened the already existing societal and political 
divisions.
19
 In the 1870s and 1880s the Belgian polity was heavily dominated by tensions caused by the central 
philosophical church-state cleavage (clericalism versus anti-clericalism) and tensions caused by the economic 
class-based cleavage (either workers versus employers or workforce versus capital). (Lauwers 2012:40-41) 
Such societal tensions raised the attractiveness of the political alternative offered by the socialists. In 1870 this 
disturbance of the electorate caused the downfall of the liberal rule and the rise of the catholic party. Still 
under Catholic ruling a party list system was introduced in Belgium (1877), giving voters the possibility to 
vote for one or more alphabetically arranged pre-printed candidate lists. In this multiple list vote system, voters 
thus had to chose between party lists (Fiers 2009:170-171 in: Schamp, Devos 2012:504) but the voter was also 
allowed to choose for more than one list (called panache voting). Candidates of the more successful party lists 
won all available parliamentary seats based on the winner takes all principle. In order to assign the seats to the 
candidates, the list votes were divided equally among all candidates on the corresponding list, following the 
list order (i.e. closed list system). David Farrell‟s remarks correctly that “[The] origin of list systems coincided 
with the development of representative democracy, and particularly with suffrage extension and the 
development of mass parties.” (2001:70). In the years 1876-1882 the electoral reform also moved incumbent 
political players like a splinter group that was instigated to form of a national Liberal Progressist party 
(Liberale progressistische Partij or LPP 1877) or the faction of Flemish socialists launching their own party 
(named Vlaamse Socialistische Arbeiderspartij (VSAP)), in the same year. The catholic supremacy was hence 
threatened by splinter groups and the Liberal party took advantage of the situation. Though the Catholic party 
returned at full strength after the 1884 national elections, another new threat arose: that of rising socialism. 
 
However, equally important, the linguistic divide, which had colored Belgian politics since the publication of 
Hendrik Consciences‟ historic epos titled De Leeuw van Vlaanderen (1839), flared up heavily once more, 
concentrating on the bilingualism of the public administration and the civil servants working for it as well as 
on the bilingual status of the alleged ville mixte, e.g. Brussels. Though the freedom of language was a 
constitutional right, in practice French had remained the official language. In fact, both the political elite and 
the administrative elite continued to speak French. (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:8) Though in Flanders the 
use of language was based on the personality principle, in Brussels –considered to be the capital of Flanders- 
the dominating language was French. After all, in that epoch French was considered “the language of 
modernity and liberalism, the lingua franca of royal courts and diplomatic circles.” (ibid.) Unilingual 
Flemings on the other hand benefitted some privileges (so-called language facilities). The expansion of the 
Brussels‟ agglomeration turned the Flemish communes around Brussels more and more francophone, and 
                                                 
18 We refer to Léon Vanderkindere, the liberal member of parliament and mayor of Ukkel, who mentioned as one of the very first 
politicians a possible split of the country in 1868, at the same time considering a reunion with the newly reunited Germany as a 
possibility. Vanderkindere based his suggestion on studies that had „proven‟ that Flemings and Walloons were two different races; 
Flemings had German roots and Walloons had Celtic roots. (Van Cauwelaert, Knack, 1 augustus 2012:27) 
19 Very similar to the voters‟ behavior in the Victorian polity described by Gary Cox (1983) in his doctoral thesis: “We argue that 
voters became more party-oriented in the 1860s and 1870s, voting more on the basis of their preferences between the two great parties 
-the Liberals and Conservatives- and less on the basis of their attitudes toward the individual candidates. This shift in the basis of 
electoral choice, we argue, with electors becoming less responsive to the issue positions adopted by MPs, meant that the electoral 
benefits to an MP of dissent were smaller relative to the sanctions available to party leaders. Hence, we expect a decline in the 
influence of constituents over the voting behavior of their MPs (and a concomitant increase in party voting.) A number of approaches 
to the measurement of the influence of constituents over their MPs' voting behavior are taken, and the findings, on the whole, support 
the hypothesis.” (http://thesis.library.caltech.edu/3181/)  
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flamingantism was very much neglected
20
. (van Velthoven 1981:247-250) Though unilingual Flemish 
residents of the capital agglomeration felt discriminated, since the early 1880s bilingualism increased in and 
around the capital and by the end of the 1880s Dutch passed on from one generation to the next, albeit only in 
a marginal way. As we will explain the crosscutting and overlapping ethnical, linguistic and religious divisions 
of the country will make it very difficult to territorialize the different communities. People in different regions 
(Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) voted largely different from each other: two-thirds of the Flemings voted 
catholic, whereas a majority of the Walloons and inhabitants of Brussels voted liberal. (cf. Matagne, Verjans 
2012:89 in: Schamp, Devos 2012b:6) Hence, electoral outcomes in the second half of the 19
th
 century were 
mixed and largely depending the region.
21
 That mixture of sentiments, ideological frames and public opinions 
has never stopped to influence the Belgian polity. When discussing the several stages in of the Belgian state 
reform further on we will note that the linguistic and community-based division of the nation motivated 
politicians in the first place to come up with (constitutional) mechanisms to secure the equal inclusion of both 
language groups in the political decision-making process and to protect the stakes of the French and the 
Flemish language communities
22
, with the ambition to preserve the sovereignty and autonomy of the unitary 
state. In their view compelling one community to take into account the other and to find political compromises 
largely invalidated and countered the demands of competitive ideologies (community-based nationalism or 
regionalism). 
 
Societal, electoral, and institutional changes and the resulting lack of democratic representation encouraged 
new political initiatives –like the socialist movement- to organize themselves and to climb on the national 
political forefront. Against the background of Nietzsche‟s post-theistic critique Gott ist todt23, the second 
largest mass party was formally founded: the Socialist Workforce party (Belgische Werkliedenpartij or BWP) 
(1885). Both Catholic and Socialist parties were typically partisan parties. Their common goal was to dethrone 
the Liberal party.
24
 By that time, however, a new elite deserving political rights was born: the intellectuals and 
the liberals were determined to win that new elite. In 1883, hence under liberal ruling and instigated by the 
ultra-progressist liberal Paul Janson
25
, the Loi des capacitaires was passed, opening up the censitair suffrage 
for the local and provincial elections to other classes than the owners, land lords and notables. Because of the 
capacitor suffrage the electorate was enlarged to 2,48% of the population (little under 137 thousand voters). 
Throughout the 1850s-1950s suffrage was manipulated strategically by one party to reduce the support of the 
competing parties and to increase its own adherence. However, in the case of the introduction of the capacitor 
suffrage the electoral reform turned out to a real debacle for the Liberal party. The Catholic party won the 
1884 elections and would dominate the Belgian politics for the next thirty years. 
 
The ostensible stability of Belgian national politics was hence heavily distorted. First of all, the political 
customs were distorted by the entrance in the parliamentary arena of the Socialist party BWP under the joint 
leadership of Gabriel Brodkom, Romain Van Loo, Joseph Maheu, Antoine Delporte, Joseph Milot, Edward 
Anseele and Alphonse Wormhout. Secondly, the political scenery was surprised by the election of more 
radical parties like the Liberal Progressist party under the leadership of Paul Jansson (1887) and by the 
Christian-democratic Flemish Christian party (or Vlaamsche Christene Volkspartij (1893)) under the 
                                                 
20 Swenden and Jans (2009:17) refer to the practice of language census determining whether or not the language status of a city or 
village should be changed and whether or not a municipality should remain in the unilingual Dutch or French language zone (at least 
50% speakers required) or bilingual language zone (at least 30% speakers of at least two languages required)) –a practice that existed 
until 1948.   
21 In the period 1857-1894 people in Flanders voted primarily catholic (at least 61%), whereas at least 51% of the Walloons and 54% of 
the people from Brussels voted liberal. (Matagne & Verjans 2012:89) 
22 For instance, the federal cabinet includes as many Dutch- as French-speaking ministers and the federal government decides with 
unanimity. (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:11) 
23 Cf. Nietzsche‟s analysis of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882). 
24 Apart from the purchase of power, socio-economic or ideological factors leading to the first School War („Schooloorlog‟) between 
the liberal side fighting for a state-subsidized public school net and the confessional camp trying to keep full control of education as it 
has always been before or the class fight between the white and blue collar workers have explained the creation, have also lead to the 
rise (and in a later stage the fall) of national political parties in Belgium since the late 1860s. But ideologies mean nothing without 
supporters. The Catholic party and its overpowering electoral position since the 1880s was –just like the Socialist party- built on 
massive extra-parliamentary recruitment in a particular segment of church-goers, sick and poor care houses and workers‟ movements 
and electoral support was largely fed by social support organizations (like the catholic co-operative networks, union or mutuality that 
had been endorsed by pope Leo XIII‟s Encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891)). (Lauwers 2012:37) Moreover, this attempt to bridge the 
minor ideological differences between the Catholic and the socialist party was in the first place a strategy to prevent the concentration 




charismatic and populist control of priest Adolf Daens (a electoral group aka Daensists) who aimed to 
implement the base line ideas of the papal encyclic Rerum Novarum (1891), in casu aid the horrible situation 
of the factory laborers and manual workers. Where election results and seat distribution are not at all 
representative for the diversity of opinions among the electorate, both mechanical and psychological effects 
lead to elevated levels of polarization between the central ideologies (Catholicism, liberalism and socialism) 
and between the traditional ideologies (Catholics and liberals) and new more radical ideologies (progressists, 
socialists etc.). That is exactly what happened in the course of the 1880s.
26
 In order to restore the balance 
between ideological and political groups the BWP, the party that presented itself as the alternative for the 19
th
 
century capitalism, demanded the replacement of the highly plurality based electoral system by a more 




Ever since the formal political organization of the labor movement the Catholic party had experienced this 
pressure to replace the tax-based suffrage dating from the Ancien Régime by a system of universal suffrage. In 
1893 the first proposal to introduce a one man one vote system was, however, declined before the parliament 
where the Catholic party had an absolute majority of 102 out of 152 seats. The socialist protest workers called 
for a national strike, a significantly enough threat to convince the Catholic party to work out an electoral 
reform on its own. In an attempt to satisfy democratic powers they proposed a system of general multiple 
suffrage
27
. The system was introduced in 1893 together with the compulsory voting and a two-round majority 
electoral rule for the legislative.
28
 The new (majoritarian) system functioned like a regular plurality system 
where all of the available seats in a district went to the candidate (or party) who won the absolute majority of 
the votes (50% + one vote), if needed after a second round (called ballotage). In the second round a simple 
majority (or plurality) was sufficient to win the seat(t). (Schamp, T. & Devos, C. 2012:506)
29
 Understanding 
the possible effects of the replacement of the censitair system the Catholic party was not entirely free of any 
fear for repudiation but greedy enough for the marginal gains that the new system might bring.
30
 Nonetheless, 
                                                 
26 High polarization is quite typically for plurality systems (Grumm 1958:358). 
27 All 25-year old men received suffrage and could gain two extra votes when proving specific capacity, when being the family head 
older than 35 years paying no less than fife BEF house tax, or proving at least 2000 BEF in bank savings or the entitlement of annuities 
for a minimum amount of 100 BEF. 
28 Cf. Electoral Law of 7 September 1893.  
29 The absurdity of the preferential (block (majority) system is easy to see as “the multiple votes of electors are separated into distinct 
repeat elections using a majority rule.” (Sanders 2012:16) This two-round multiple vote majority system is also know as a preferential 
block (majority) vote system. 
30 Referring to Rose and Urwin (1970) it is more generally believed that political parties will more likely try to accommodate cross-
social cleavages for what they call „temporary electoral advantage‟ rather than risking electoral repudiation. More to it, “(…)even 
where elections threaten survival of the regime [as was the case in Belgium in the late 1890s], governing parties usually do not engage 
in systematically altering the electoral system to strengthen themselves and to disadvantage opponents of the regime.” Not so in 
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the electoral reform of 1893 served a clear anti-revolutionary purpose.  
 
After the new electoral system was passed, Belgium counted 1,370,000 voters (21,6% of the population). In 
1892 the growth of the population had already caused the increase in the number of parliamentary seats to 152 
(from 138 seats). 
 
Andrew McLaren Carstairs demonstrated in his Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe (1980) 
that also in the case of Belgium the shift from plurality to list proportionality was via a two-round majoritarian 
system (Farrell 2001:177). This system was considered a compromise between those willing to improve the 
negative effects of the SMD and MMD plurality and therefore to make the electoral system more proportional 
and those not at all willing to adopt the full proportional representation. Due to the combination of a series of 
other institutional factors total disproportionality of the representation in parliament after the 1894 elections, 
however, was inflated to historic levels –rather than lowered. First of all, one out of four districts after the 
1893 electoral reform still was a single member districts, the election in such districts was based on plurality. 
Secondly, the size of the national parliament (152 seats) and therefore the change of the average size of a 
constituency was changed, Ghent and Antwerp –two Flemish cities- here-included, however, the overall 
change for the bulk of constituencies was very limited. Hence the effect on the total disproportionality of the 
seat distribution in those districts was small. Thirdly, a mixture of other elements also reinforced the 
disproportional outcome indirectly. Both voters and party leaders changed their voting or electoral strategies. 
Opening up the elections to all aged man combined with the introduction of compulsory voting and the 
multiple voting rights for certain categories of voters (educated men, tax-paying men, house-owners, and 
family owners) after all worried a great number of conservative voters. Because the outcome of the new 
multiple vote majoritarian system was more unpredictable than before (cf. Farrell 2001:52) and afraid of the 
election of socialist candidates many radical liberal voters in Flanders, especially in the large cities where the 
BWP was primarily present (campaigning on issues that also concerned the radical liberals
31
) and therefore 
polarizing the political debate, voted for a catholic candidate.
32
 For the same reason in Brussels the mainly 
liberal electorate had turned away massively from the Liberal party to the Catholic party and towards the 
Socialist party or towards the cartel party of liberals and socialists. Finally, the Catholic party left the 1894 
election arena triumphantly in a record number of districts.
33
 In sum, the electoral reform of 1893 included the 
ingredients necessary to put an end to the Liberal hegemony. The Liberal party, though largely 
underrepresented, had become nothing more than a small opposition party… Imagine, even the most radical 
opponent of the great catholic front man Charles Woeste, the Christian-democrat Daens, managed to get 
elected.  
 
As the below graph shows, the partial elections of 1896 and 1898 reaffirmed the division of power between 
the three main parties and ideologies, more in particular those elections reaffirmed the supremacy of the 
Catholic party. The electoral success of the Catholic party in the May 1898 parliamentary elections can be 
explained partly by the internal dissention of the socialists regarding the Equality Law. One of the effects of 
the strong opposition of the Walloon socialist against that law, was that a large part of the Flemish socialist 
electorate turned towards the Catholic party. As a consequence the overrepresentation of the Catholics in 
parliament had grown to rather astronomic proportions. In the year 1898 total overrepresentation of the largest 
party (the Catholic party) was 29,57% (from 17% in 1894). (cf. graph below: the level of overrepresentation of 
the largest party is expressed by the D’Hondt D disproportionality index34) The  underrepresentation of the 
smaller parties was on average 3,24% (per party) (from 1,34% in 1894).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Belgium at the end of the 19th Century… but, because of the increasing success of the Socialistst BWP, exactly the reason why the last 
cabinet Beernaert (1884-1894) has coupled to the one man one vote to the „compulsory vote‟.   
31 According to Lauwers (2012:38-39) what remained of the Liberal party after the 1898 elections were mainly doctrinaire anti-
clericals, employers, bourgeois or middle class. They purposely neglected issues like human rights, child labor, general suffrage  and so 
on –issues that were not at all neglected by the Socialist or the Catholic party. The radical wing of the Liberal party, on the other hand, 
supported the idea of more democratic participation or the abolishment of child labor under 12 years. 
32 When the liberal candidate did not stand a chance in the first round. In the second round an even larger share of the traditionally 
liberal electorate (especially in Ghent or Antwerp) voted for the candidate of the Catholic party. 
33 This political reality convinced the catholic rulers to introduce „as an experiment‟ a system of limited proportional representation for 
the 1895 communal elections but only for those seats that were not taken by candidates that obtained 50%+1 of the votes and therefore 
were directly elected to the communal council, and proportionally based on the number of votes obtained by all party lists. (Muylle 
2012:310) 





Never before (or later) the parliamentary seats have been divided in a more disproportional way than in the 
period 1894-„98. Likewise, the underrepresentation of the Liberal party on the other hand reached similar 
levels in those years. 
 




 Century democracy and the party system in Belgium were in a deep crisis. When 
assessing both the systemic and strategic consequences of the electoral reform of the 1880s-1890s, a complete 
imbalanced outcome, totally unacceptable to the smaller parties, was the result. As a consequence, those 
parties joined the Socialist party in its claim to introduce the universal suffrage. The skewed outcome of the 
1894 to 1898 parliamentary elections in Belgium under the general multiple voting system is a clear example 




With the expansion of the suffrage just before the 1894 national elections, the position of the Catholic party 
was reinforced (Devos 2006:260). Liberalism was more or less crushed between both socialism and 
Catholicism, both mass ideologies. (Lauwers 2012:37)  As a matter of fact, because of the strategic voting the 
liberal had almost crushed themselves. The Catholics took advantage of the situation and in 1898 the Equality 
Law (Gelijkheidswet) was voted on. The law was proposed by the Flemish catholic Juliaan Devriendt and 
placed Dutch (i.e. Flemish) at the same level for all legal and lawmaking matters and for state-related official 





At the end of the 19
th
 Century the liberal family was more divided than ever before. At the one hand the party 
included a bloc of so-called „evolutionary‟ liberals promoting positive freedom (based on the power of 
individual self-realization), being less anti-clerical and more socially engaged… compared to the bloc of pure 
„utilitarian‟ liberals37 promoting ideas of negative freedom (based on limiting intervention in society of the 
authorities). Such schisms between doctrinaire and radical liberals appeared in nearly all liberal families in 




 Century. Those intra-party divisions added to the inter-party polarization and 
the repositioning of the traditional parties along new beliefs and ideologies. Rooted in a reformist socialistic 
dream
38
, the democratization process of society in general and of the democratization of the electoral 
institution more in particular seem to be an important explanatory factor for the evolution of the parties and the 





3.3 To accept „the party‟ means to accept pluralism40 
 
In his doctoral thesis titled Changer pour gagner? Les réformes des lois électorales en Belgique (2007) Jean-
Benoit Pilet observed that in the case of ideological realignment of the electorate, a true electoral rupture 
crystallizing the new electoral groups is needed to demonstrate the urge for an alignment of the electoral rule 




 Century had produced 
                                                 
35
 “(…)multiple-vote adaptations of the plurality and majority electoral formulae to multi-member districts, (…) should be judged 
unacceptable as democratic electoral systems” because “(…)these systems concentrate representation among large voting groups as 
district magnitude increases, perversely increasing the disproportionality of the vote/seat outcome rather than lessening it.” (Sanders 
2012:16) Concerning the effects of the majority system, Farrell a.o. looked into the outcome of the French and Australian majoritarian 
systems in the post-WWII period (1949-1998) and he concluded that in fact, “(…) the evidence from both countries‟ majoritarian 
systems suggests electoral trends which are strikingly similar to those for single-member plurality (SMP). Smaller parties are 
disadvantaged by the highly disproportional results; larger parties are advantaged; parties with a good geographical concentration in 
support tend to do better.” (Farrell 2001:63) The outcome being highly disproportional or even non-proportional (ibid.:50) and because 
the electoral dynamics outbid small parties not to field candidates in the second round (Sartori 1997:65-7 in: Farrell 2001:64) the 
Belgian election anno 1898 clearly encouraged what Farrell calls „a politics of centrism‟. Other mechanical effects of the electoral 
system are dealing with the additional burden (and cost) for all voters being entitled to vote twice or even more times, which in itself 
risks higher levels of no-show or a larger orphaned electorate and of higher levels of electoral volatility that feed a general mood of 
„electoral uncertainty‟ (ibid.:64, 65) –effects that are largely comparable to those of other multiple voting MMD-based majority 
systems. 
36
 Cf. Van Cauwelaert, R., Knack, 1 augustus 2012, p. 26, 27. 
37 The term comes from A. Kinniging et al. (1988), who was quoted in Lauwers (2012:38). 
38 Cf. Eduard Berstein‟s and Frederik Engels‟ writings on „the participation of workers in parliamentary democracy‟ (in: Lauwers 
2012:36). 
39 The Liberal party shifted from a socially progressive to a conservative position whereas the Catholic party shifted from a mainly 
conservative to a socially progressive position. 
40 Cf. Ignazi 1996:561. 
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exactly a rupture of that scale. A change of the electoral institution was therefore urgently needed. The 
abandonment of the majority electoral system and the introduction of the proportional seat distribution system 
D‟Hondt (called P.R.-system)41 for the national legislative election was motivated partly by a theoretic fear of 
a situation where members of parliament could be elected without an overall majority of support in their 
constituencies (Farrell 2001:70) and partly by a not so theoretic fear of a situation where the growth of the 
Socialist party and the intra-party division of the liberals would actually lead to the disappearance of the 
Liberal party. Because the Catholic party did not want to compete with the Socialist party one on one, the 
Catholic party risked a drawback of its own electoral success the Catholics decided to leave the plurality 
system and to introduce the P.R.-system. (Muylle 2012:310) Whereas the positive message is that the Belgian 
political elite had the desire to adopt an electoral system that optimized the representation of different 
subgroups
42
, the introduction of the P.R.-system in 1899 (first application in 1900) is a good example of 
institutional reformism driven by self-interest, in casu a strategic electoral change orchestrated by the Catholic 
party. In other words, “[t]o the extent that parties and fractionalization were unavoidable, the re-establishment 
of broad electoral representation required the invention and introduction of new electoral rules different from 
the traditional, now obsolete system based on multi-member districts and majoritarian rules.” (Colomer 
2007:270) Hence Duverger‟s laws upside down: it‟s the party system that forms the electoral system…. 
(Colomer 2005) 
 
The result of the introduction of the P.R.-system was positive for the Liberal party because the downward 
electoral trend imbedded since the mid-1880s was reversed, at the expense of the ruling Catholic party. The 
electoral score and parliamentary representation of Socialist party stagnated. Hence mission accomplished. Yet 
the electoral reform of 1899 was meaningful for other than strict representative reasons as well. First of all, 
ever since 1899 party lists contained both effective candidates and candidate-followers and both were listed 
alphabetically. Voters could mark either the list vote or more or more candidates on the same list of one or 
more followers of that list, or all three together (list, candidate and follower), but within the same party list. 
The election of candidate-followers made partial elections every two years largely preventable and thus this 
change meant to end of the interim or partial elections in districts where an elected candidate for instance died 
or stepped down. Secondly, as indicated already above, the practice of panache voting was forbidden. Votes 
for more than one or more candidates on more than one list were invalidated. Thirdly, the distribution of list 
vote was changed: only full list votes were transferrable, limiting the total number of transferrable list votes to 
those bulletins that only contained the list vote (hence not in combination with one or more name votes). Like 
before the transfer of list votes was largely benefitting the highest ranked candidates. Fourthly, smaller 
districts were merged into larger MMDs districts increasing significantly the average size of electoral districts 





About 1,47 million Belgian male voters participated in the parliamentary election of May 27
th
 1900 (plus 
minus 22% of the total population). 
 
The introduction of the P.R.-system has had several effects (e.g. an increased voter turnout) that made the 
outcome more legitimate. But the main effect concern the proportional representation of competing parties and 
therefore the number of parliamentary parties. At the one hand the P.R.-system minimized the distortion 
between the number of votes a party wins and the number of seats it ends up with in parliament (Farrell 
2001:153-154), and therefore distributed the available seats
44
 far more equally among the parties participating 
in the election (but far from perfectly equally and being favorable to large parties (Benoit, K. 2000:384, 387). 
At the other hand, this effect was often reinforced by an increase of the number of available parliamentary 
                                                 
41 The system-D‟Hondt was introduced with the Law of 29 December 1899 concerning the application of the proportional 
representation in legislative elections (BS 30/12/1899). The system D‟Hondt is based on a highest averages with divisor series 1, 2, 3, 
4,…).  
42 Farrell refers to the Association Réformiste pour l’Adoption de la Représentation Proportionelle in 1881 of which Victor D‟Hondt 
was a founding member, and the conference at Antwerp in 1885 where the D‟Hondt proposal for a list system of election was chosen 
as the most appropriate seat distribution method over the Hare quote (single transferrable vote system). (2001:70-71) These initiatives 
were typically demonstrating such “(…)proclivities of the political elite” to make choices in favor of one or the other electoral system 
or to design the electoral system. (ibid.:175, 176)   
43 The number of seats (or mandates) varied between two (Neufchateau-Virton) to 18 (Brussels). In total the Belgian Chamber or 
Representatives then counted 152 seats. It is obvious that P.R. could not be obtained in a similar way everywhere. 
44 According to John Grumm (1958) the number of parliamentary seats had increased which is not entirely correct because the number 
of Seats in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in the years 1894 to 1898 remained 152. The number increased to 166 seats but 
only at the time of the 1902 elections.  
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seats which lead to surplus votes for all electoral parties (Grumm 1958:364), to be effectuated for the Belgian 





Compared to the pre-1900 period in which the majority/plurality system was in place with the P.R.-
proportional representation, the average total disproportionality rate since the 1900 elections dropped with 
more than 70%. Disproportionality however clearly did not disappear entirely. That raises the important 
question of „How (dis)proportional and democratic is the D’Hondt P.R.-system?‟ 
 
The immediate result for the Catholic party –the largest political party- of the combination of both above 
mentioned dynamics was a decline of its seat share with 15% (to 86 of the 152 seats (or 56,6%)). This 
correction may seem significant, however, due to the time effect of the partial elections, the negative impact of 
the electoral reform on the Catholic party‟s parliamentary overrepresentation in the years 1900 to 1904 was 
more or less sustained. After the 1906 national elections the overrepresentation of the largest ideological 
family (until 1978 this was the Catholics) dived below five percent for the first time in Belgium‟s electoral 
history –a level that is rather typical for parliamentary democracies using the D‟Hondt-system.46 Because of 
the PR-system the Liberal party was saved from extinction. The party won 31 seats in 1900 (20,4%) and 42 in 
1904 (25%). Nonetheless, the Catholic party was able to prolong its absolute majority in the House of 
Representatives and the Catholics‟ position was consolidated until the introduction of the general suffrage for 
all aged male Belgians in 1919. (cf. infra)  
 
The number of parliamentary seats grew to 186 (and 187) seats in the years 1912 to 1932. At the 1912 
elections the Liberal party a second downfall since only 5,38% of the Walloon vote went to the Liberal party 
compared to 42,33% for the cartel party of liberals and socialists, gaining 45 of the 186 seats. Surprisingly the 
Catholic party left the electoral battle field stronger than it had entered it. In Wallonia a large protest rose 
against the election result. In Liège an uprising of blue collar workers broke out. Four demonstrators, among 
whom a child, were killed by police forces, and 20 wounded.
47
 The proponents of a partition of Belgium in 
two autonomous administrative regions gained support, also in socialist circles.  
 
It took the Liberal party until the 1914 election to fully regain its strength. In that year the seat share of the 
Liberal family almost doubled, and that of the socialists almost tripled – both to the expense of the Catholic 
faction. Dissatisfied with the declining vote share of the Catholic party, a splinter group named the Catholic 
Union (Katholieke Unie), was founded the same year. In 1914 Belgium had the highest population rate (7,6 
million inhabitants) and it was the fifth economic power worldwide. (de Schaepdrijver 1997:11)  
 
The organization of the command of the Belgian army, which existed more often than not out of French-
speaking officers, re-emphasized the already widespread traditional socio-linguistic and political divide of 
Belgium‟s society. That divide had been mapped since the late 1800s but was reinforced in the late 1910s: 
Flanders was (still) relatively more catholic than the other two regions, Wallonia was more socialistic, and 
Brussels was more liberal. (Matagne & Verjans 2012:93, 95) This pairing of issues dealing with language, 
ideology and culture at one side and religious and ideological conviction at the other was the cradle of the so-
called communautarian cleavage between the Flemish and the Walloon community. As the development of 
the Belgian national party system will demonstrate: this community-based division would eventually lead to 
the federalization of the country in the 1970s.
48
 (cf. infra) In the deeply communautarian divide lied the seed of 
what is often referred to as the incumbency of peripheral parties that are de facto posing an electoral threat to 
the concentration of centralization of power with the traditional state parties (Alonso 2012:50-54; 93-108). But 




                                                 
45 www.verkiezingsdatabase.be (http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be) 
46 This level is comparable to the theoretic level of disproportionality of 4,96% of the 15 countries having an electoral formula based 
on the D‟Hondt devisor mentioned in Farrell 2001:161.  
47
 Cf. Van Cauwelaert, R., Knack, 8 augustus 2012, p. 25. 
48 A federalization by disaggregation as Swenden et al. call it, characterized by the transfer of considerable political, legal, fiscal and 
spending autonomy to constitutionalised units of a federated state, hence very different from the kind of federalization that emerges 
when (independent) regions or states are merged together or aggregated to a larger federal entity. (2009:2) 
49 For instance confession-ideological differences delayed the voting of the law that installed obligatory education and the 
corresponding law that inhibited child labor under the age of fourteen. (van Velthoven 1981b:261) 
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Hence, the foremost important political issue that King-soldier Albert I had to deal with after WWI was how 
to reunite the country. The King called openly for a government of „national unity‟. In that respect the 1920s 
would be the stepping stone towards the change of rules governing the use of language by public authorities 
and of the creation of three linguistic territories: one for the Dutch speaking part of the country, one for the 
French speaking part and one where both languages could be used (Brussels). (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 
2009:8) Secondly, the King did not hesitate to echo the long lasting demand by the democratic forces in 
society for a radical reform of the electoral system that would allow for a more democratic representation of 
all classes and groups in society.  By the end of the year 1921 two important electoral reforms were prepared 
by the unionist government including all three main ideological party families laid down in the Pact of 
Loppem (1918)). (Schamp, Devos 2011:499) First of all the coalition agreement included the introduction of 
the universal single suffrage for all 21 year old men (cf. het algemeen enkelvoudig stemrecht (AES)). 
Secondly, a complex system of list connection and apparenting –also named after its inventor, the system-Van 
de Walle- was introduced to optimize small party representation (and quite successfully!).
50
 Apparenting was 
expected to correct the disproportionality produced by the D‟Hondt highest average seat distribution system 
(Lijphart 1994) and to compensate for the many wasted votes for smaller parties not being able to win a seat 
(Farrell 2001:78).  
 
Driven by anti-Belgian sentiments at the time the rumors of an imminent electoral reform started to circulate 
and in view of the better chances of becoming electorally livable and stable the Flemish-nationalist Front Party 
(Frontpartij) was founded. The universal single suffrage for men was applied for the first time in the 1919 
legislative elections (even though the constitution was adapted only in 1921). In 1919 the Catholic party lost 
26 seats (-14%), the Liberal party lost 11 seats, and the Socialist party won 30 (+16%). The catholic and 
socialist party had become equally big (70 seats or 37,63% seat share). The liberal representation in the 
parliamentary half round was half the size. Nine seats in total went to split parties, of which the Front Party 
obtained five (or 2,68% of the available seats). The electoral reform of 1919-1921 hence sharply marked the 
end of the Catholic hegemonic rule. Ever since coalition negotiation talks have been the basis of government 
formation... The coalition government was a fact in Belgian politics. 
 
The constitutional reform of 7 February 1921 and the national elections later that year put an end to the 
government of national unity. At the same time 1921 was the start of an era of general passive political 
involvement of Belgian women. Though all aged women were granted the right to vote at the local level, the 
general female suffrage for the national elections was postponed (until 1948, cf. infra)
51
. The result of the 1921 
national election, in which 91% of the 1,762 million Belgian man participated, largely confirmed the electoral 
weight of the three largest parties: a status quo for the Catholic party, minus two seats for the Socialist party 
and minus one seat for the Liberal party and the Front Party. The Christian People‟s Party (Christene 
Volkspartij) won six seats.  
 
3.4 Political orthodoxy and the rising of radicalization and political extremism 
 
The roaring twenties did produce industrial growth and a boost in cultural and artistic as well as political life. 
But a great depression and the worldwide economic shake-up provoked several extreme political ideologies.
52
 
Many of them stepped up onto the political forum, for example the Communist Party (KP/PC), established in 
Belgium in 1924. This caused a chain reaction in many old democracies. For instance the foundation of the 
anti-communist and anti-corporatist ultra-Catholic Flemish National Association (Katholiek Vlaams Nationaal 
Verbond (1925)) was clearly a reaction to the „godless‟ KP/CP. To compensate for the Belgian losses of the 
                                                 
50 Cf. Farrell (2001:78) for a definition: “Apparentement is used most commonly in D‟Hondt systems to compensate for the relatively 
low disproportionality of the result (compared with other list systems).” In the remainder transfer system (like in Belgium) the 
proportions of higher-tier seats are not fixed in advance. (ibid.:81) The number of higher-tier seats (or left-over seats) is the total 
number of seats available in the district mines the number of seats distributed directly in the first- or lower tier distribution. The latter is 
the sum for all individual parties of the number of votes of the respective party divided by the electoral quotient. (Schamp, Devos 2012: 
558-560) 
51 By the end of the 1920s in most West-European voting right were given to women. (Schamp, Devos 2012:512-513) 
52 No less than eleven new parties participated in the 1925 elections, among which the Christian Workers (Christelijke Werklieden), 
the Farmers party (Agriculteurs), the Middle Class party (Classe moy/Middenklasse), the Christian democrats, the Légionnaires, the 
Famers Unions, the Radical Socialists, the National Legion (Légion Nationale), the Neutrals, the Parti National Wallon, and the 
Independants. None of these parties managed to obtain more than 1% of the total vote. In 1929 more split lists entered the electoral 




WWI, the German East cantons Eupen, Malmédy and Sankt-Vith were „added‟ to the arrondissement of 
Verviers. Because of the annexation of the German East cantons in 1925 a new electoral district (representing 
one seat) was created and the total number of seats in the Chamber of Representatives increased with one unit  
to 187.  
 
In the early 1930s numerous ultra-radical parties were born.
53
 National politics became the playing field of 
many dissatisfied and frustrated groups and persons, often radicalizing  and ridiculizing the sérieux of the 
national and international political customs. The ultra-nationalistic and authoritarian Verdinaso (Verbond van 
Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen (1931)) was founded by Joris Van Severen. In the 1932 national elections the 
ultra-nationalists won eight seats. In an attempt to respond and dam such radicalization, in 1932 the Dutch and 
French languages were acknowledged as officially „equal‟ administrative languages in Belgium. Brussels 
capital became officially bilingual. Two years before the University of Ghent (Universiteit Gent) had been 
Flemishified (1930), but that had only nourished the nationalistic sentiments and the hope for more cultural 
autonomy of Flanders.  
 
Mirroring the nationalistic dream of Hitler‟s NSDAP, in 1933 the right-radical Flemish National Association 
(Vlaams  Nationaal Verbond (VNV)) was founded by Staf de Clercq. In an attempt to safeguard the national 
unity a tripartite of Catholics, liberals and socialists (1935) replaced the Catholic-liberal coalition cabinets that 
had governed since the 1927 elections. The cabinet Van Zeeland I however was heavily attacked by the non-
traditional parties (nationalists, radicals and communists) and fell after 14 months. At the 1936 elections the 
VNV, incorporating Verdinaso, obtained 16 of the 202 seats. Fascism had undoubtedly found its way inside 
the Belgian political system. The ultra-conservative, militant Catholic and corporatist party REX (1936), lead 
by a Walloon named Leon Degrelle, was a newcomer to and won 21 seats (or 10,4%). The infiltration of anti-
democratic forces put the traditionally liberal parliamentary democracy to the test.
54
 With 18% of the seats in 
the hands of a handful of anti-democratic and anti-elitist organizations at both sides of the language border the 
more ultra-conservative wing of the Catholic party, that had experienced the greatest electoral loss (-18 seats), 
had become very sensitive to the nationalistic and corporatist discourse of VNV and REX. Nonetheless in the 
years 1936 to 1939 the subsequent cabinets (Paul Van Zeeland II, Paul-Emile Janson and Paul-Henri Spaak I) 
were lead by Catholics who managed to keep the nationwide tripartite of Catholics, liberals and socialists on 
the rails.  
 
Differences in popularity of national socialism versus collectivism between the Flemish and the Walloon 
divided the Catholic party along the line of the language border. In the years 1937-1938 the Catholic party was 
the first traditional party to start the process towards the regionalization of the party organization. In an effort 
of satisfying the regionalist fractions, the Catholic party was the first traditional party to reorganize around a 
Flemish branch (Christelijke Volkspartij or CVP) and a Walloon branch (Parti Sociale Chrétien or PSC), with 
the main goal to win back the ultra-conservative and nationalist voter. Though both branches were still 
operating within one national party organization in a way this regionalization of the central party was 
accentuating rather than camouflaging or settling regional differences and tensions in regional approaches.  
 
After losing the 1939 elections, the socialist BWP transformed into the Belgian Socialist party with a Flemish 
and a Walloon part (BSP/PSB, 64 seats in total), however still operating under one single party structure. The 
Catholic party won six seats. Once more it became the largest party with 67 seats. The Liberal party won ten 
seats and obtained 33 in total. The two winning parties formed the cabinet under the premiership of the 
Catholic Hubert Pierlot
55
. With 17 seats the Flemish Nationalists were the fourth largest faction in the national 
parliament. The number of split list parties had decreased to ten; most of them pulled by one or the other 
notorious politician
56
. Just like the graph above shows, the interbellum is a remarkably period because of its 
                                                 
53 By the elections of 1932 and 1936 the number of not-represented dissident, split and other lists had reached the number of 18 resp. 
19! Many of them had ridiculous names and ambitions like Watch (Klok), Isolated (Isolé), Tax payers (Lastenbetalers) or Pigeon 
Lovers (Duivenliefhebbers). 
54 Cf. Bruno De Wever in Knack, 13 Febr. 2013, pp. 41-42. 
55 The cabinet Pierlot I (February 1939) fell in its first week and was continued as the cabinet Pierlot II (18 April to 3 September 
1939). 
56 Cf. Liste Lahaut, Liste Dekeyser, Liste Verbist, Liste Frenssen (won one seat in 1939) and many other. The bulk of these newcomer 
parties however did not manage to pass the real electoral threshold, as indicated by the above graph.  
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temporary amplified political instability
57
, the quest for an answer against the rise of extremism and its 
relatively large numbers of electoral parties. From the introduction of the P.R.-system and prior to the first 
state reform of 1970, 1936 and 1939 were also the years in which the national party system arrived at 




Under Nazi German occupation party politics in Belgium had de facto come to a standstill. That however did 
not mean the end of political turmoil. After the war, a sense of reunification permeated the Belgian society. 
The Belgian voter was fed up with extremism and fascism, as well as with the Lilliput lists drawn by anti-
politicians that lead basically nowhere. The general resentment translated into the marginalization and 
virtually disappearance of REX and VNV at the 1946 elections. The CVP/PSC won 92 of the 202 seats. The 
Socialist party won 66, and the Communist party won 23. The liberals lost half of their representation (16 
seats). Two other parties –the Union of Belgians (Union des Belges (UDB)) and a cartel of liberals and 
socialists- won respectively one and four seats. The one seat of the UDB helped the socialist Achille Van 
Acker (BSP) to form a cabinet with the Liberal party and the communist party and to drop the Catholic party. 
 
Despite the electoral success of the Communist party and its part-taking in the cabinets Van Acker I and II, the 
Belgian adherence of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist Truman doctrine in the years 1945 and 1946 forced 
the Belgian KP/CP to leave the Belgian government in 1947. One election later, the presence of the 
Communists was halved (12 seats in 1949). The Catholics and the liberals won 13 seats each. One explanation 
of this remarkable electoral shift is the impact of the Truman doctrine. Another concerns the introduction of 
the enlargement of the general suffrage to all aged women. 
 
In fact, in the year 1948, the universal suffrage for all aged man and women was finally introduced by the Law 
of 27 March
58
. From one election to the other the electorate grew from 23,25% of the total Belgian population 
to 59% (being 5,031 million persons). In 1949 the size of the parliament increased with ten seats to 212 
seats.
59
 Even though the female suffrage in Belgium was observed not “to have significantly affected party 
strength” (Rose, Urwin 1970:291), the position of the Catholic and liberal party nonetheless was strengthened 
                                                 
57 In the 1930s until the invasion of the Germans on 10 May 1940 no less than ten cabinets were formed. Not only was the average 
length of a legislature being less than 11 months, the period counts five governments of national unity (tripartites), including the 
cabinet Pierlot III (1939-1940) that lasted less than eight months.  
58 „Finally‟ because it came 30 to 40 years later than many other Western democracies like Finland (1906), Norway, Iceland, Denmark, 
Austria (1920). (cf. Schamp, Devos 2012:512-513) 
59 Except for the enlargement of the parliament in 1949 which was following the enlargement of the electorate resulting from the 
introduction of the general suffrage (Law of 27 March 1948), the number of seats followed the growth of the Belgian population.  
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in the 1949 elections (+10% to almost 50%)
60
. Rudi Van Doorslaer
61
 suggests that the Catholic party was 
rewarded for their moral leadership, despite the fact that the 'pragmatic' treatment of the Jewish problem by the 
King (Leopold III) and the Belgian political and judicial elite as well as by the leadership of the Catholic 
church was largely debatable. The position of the Socialist party was consolidated and that of the Communist 
and nationalistic parties further weakened. Belgians were clearly fed up with extremist ideologies and 
redirected towards the traditional ideologies. Hence Belgium confirms the general trend spotted in most 
Western European countries, namely that Christian Democratic parties were favored and Communist and 
Socialist parties disadvantaged by female suffrage, just like it had been the case with early introductions of 
female suffrage (for instance in Finland (1906) or Austria (1920)). (Dogan 1967:161) As a matter of fact 
women were said to vote for the old parties, and hence not to vote for parties promoting extreme opinions. 
 
3.5 In search of unification strategies for a multi-faced society  
 
According to Matagne and Verjans the most important political phenomenon of the 1950s and 1960s was the 
passage from a two-and-a-half party system to a multiparty system. The legislature years of 1961 to 1965 were 
pivotal since they lead to significant electoral losses for all three traditional party families. (2012:90) More to 
it, the linguistic decomposition of Belgium also had a direct effect on the traditional „pillar‟ parties…  
 
Political life in the 1950s was characterized by the (absolute) predominance of the Catholic party. The 
CVP/PSC attempted to control and solve the Royal Question (1950), which was decided with the abdication of 
King Leopold III in favor of his oldest son Boudewijn after a national referendum on the King‟s return to the 
Belgian throne was held in 1951. Though the outcome of the referendum had been in favor of the King‟s 
return (57,68% nationwide), the result once more showed the old signs of a divided country: in general 
(catholic) Flemings voted significantly more than the (socialist) Walloons in favor of the King‟s return. But 
the divide depended largely on the rural versus industrial character within each region. (Buelens 2009 in: 
Schamp, Devos 2012:589) In those days Belgian society and politics was axed on at least three central 
dimensions: class, religion, and communal or territorial divisions. (Rose 1969:35) Belgium was still heavily 
religiously divided anti-positioning the electorally successful Catholic bloc and the not so successful anti-
clerical liberal bloc. Yet, the regionalist bloc was regaining political strength in the 1950s in a very forceful 
way. In its wake all three traditional parties were preparing for the split in a Flemish and Walloon wing. (cf. 
infra) Its main political objective being the regionalization of Belgium and the equal treatment of Flemings 
and Walloons in 1954, the Flemish People‟s Union (Volksunie (VU)62) was established right after the WWII63 
as a reaction to what was perceived as an act of self-denial of the (Catholic) majority. The VU won its first 
seats for the Chamber of Representatives in Antwerp (one in 1954 and one in 1958). As Richard Rose points 
out correctly the Flemish nationalists of the VU aimed primarily at the „deconstitution‟ of the Belgian state, in 
order to form an autonomous Flemish nation-state consistent with its ethnic loyalty. (1969:32) But the VU was 
also the first party in Belgium to put post-modern issues more prominent on the political agenda such as the 
demilitarization of Belgium, the promotion of world peace, environmental care and so on. It is therefore said 
that within Flanders the VU was the first indigenous cath-all party in the across-cleavage and across-class 




In 1958 the (second) School Question demonstrated again the de facto divide of the Belgian public and 
political opinion into three camps: a Flemish, a Walloon and a Brussels camp. While trying to keep the 
country together and to stay into power the dominant CVP/PSC –chased and whipped by the regionalists- was 
forced to take consensual measures and set its own priority list largely aside. In spite of the ongoing 
polarization around the central ideas of the modern Flemish movement, the Catholic party family managed to 
resolve the School Question by the School Pact of 1958. 
 
After the 1961 census it appeared that the population of the Flemish provinces was growing faster than that of 
the Walloon provinces. That conclusion lead to two important changes: first of all, an adaptation of the 
number of seats per electoral district in the Chamber and the Senate and, secondly, a shift of the division of 
                                                 
60 In Flanders the CVP would win one absolute majority after another until the 1961 elections.   
61 Cf. Knack, 13 Febr. 2013, p. 44. 
62 The credo of the VU: “Alles voor Vlaanderen, Vlaanderen voor Christus!” (Everything for Flanders, Flanders for Christ!) 
63 The VU was created out of the ashes of the Flemish Concentration (Vlaamse Concentratie, 1949-1954) that was not been successful 
in winning a parliamentary seat in the 1949 national elections. 
64 Cf. Rose and Urwin, “i.e. (…) appealing to voters across class, confessional and other traditional lines of division.” (1970:299) 
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seats between the two language groups.  
 
After the formal division of the Catholic party in two regional parties (CVP in Flanders and PSC in Wallonia) 
in 1961, the Catholic family lost its absolute representative majority in the 1965 elections (less than 45% of 
the total vote).
65
 Around the same time as the formal split of the Catholic party family along the language 
barrier, the country itself was split on paper in a Dutch-speaking and a French-speaking part (Brussels capital 
being officially bilingual). That country-split was the result of the voting of the language laws of 1962 and 
1963. The language laws make Belgium a school example of a country in which religious differences between 
groups were reinforced by the communal differences (Rose 1969:41), resulting in the societal, political and 
institutional break-up of the nation, for at least two reasons. Firstly, party politically relevant cleavages 
reinforced the tensions between the (mainly Catholic) Flemish part and the (mainly socialist) Walloon part of 
the country (as said before the region of Brussels was foremost liberal in kind). Secondly, the increasing 
communautarism of the 1950s and 1960s undeniably has produced increasing strains in the regimes like 
Belgium and has increased disruptive tendencies in the major parties, and also, in the streets of Belgian cities. 
(cf. Rose 1969:42) But more importantly, the regionalist (like the FDF, cf. infra), extreme right (like Vlaams 
Blok), ecologist (like AGALEV/Ecolo), and extreme left (like PVDA) ideologies underlying those disruptions 
were capable of getting organized and managed to participate in elections at the legislative level and get 
represented. (Pilet 2012:431)  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Belgian political system progressively had advanced towards a political system 
with a relative open character. A moderate effective threshold as low as 3% and in some districts even as low 
as 0,5% had allowed for the election of new political formations (regionalists, ecologist and extreme right). 
(Pilet 2012:431) Because many francophone citizens (in Brussels) felt that the installation of the language 
border was a political defeat and an injustice done to the French speaking part of Belgium
66
, an ethno-
regionalist francophone party called Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones (FDF) was created to defend the 
political standpoints of the unitary francophone voter.
67
 Despite the francophone protest, in 1965 the language 
border was officially drawn.
68
 From 1965 onwards the Flemish members of parliament would outnumber the 
Walloon and Brussels MPs. (Sinardet 2009:76-77) The arrangement reconfirmed the regime of permanent 
facilities given to French-speaking people living in six communes of the Brussels periphery. This kind of 
solution Lijphart (1968) names politics of accommodation. (in: Daalder 1974:611-612); precisely the sort of 
solution that Belgians need to get rid of if the politicians are aiming to solve the issues related to the linguistic 
territoriality problem. (Van Parijs 2009:99-100)
69
 In 1965 total inter-party electoral volatility rose to 
historically high levels; a total of 16,42% of the voters switched parties. The biggest losers were the Catholic 
party and the Socialist party (both minus +-10% seat share), the greatest winners were the Liberal party (+14% 
seat share) and the regionalist bloc (+6%). 
 
1968 was a year marked by the May 1968 emancipation movement, the freedom movement and anti-war and 
                                                 
65 A level that the Catholic parties would not be able to regain, cf. graph below, not even in the late 1970s when the Catholic bloc 
experienced somewhat „a revival‟ (cf. Swyngedouw, Vander Weyden 2006:217). 
66 As Deschouwer and Van Parijs noted “French speakers, (…), tend to invoke the principle that official boundaries should track real-
life trends, including the spread of the stronger language.” (2009:9)  
67
 FDF is also named Front Démocratique des Francophones. (cf. Swenden & Jans 2009:17) 
68 The language border affected two electoral districts: the district Komen-Moescroen was shifted from the arrondissement Ieper-
Kortrijk to the arrondissement Tournai (Doornik) and the district Voeren was shifted from the arrondissement Liège (Luik) to the 
arrondissement Tongeren-Maaseik. 
69 The Flemish political philosopher Philippe Van Parijs (2009) makes a profound exercise on the future of Belgium, the position and 
relationships of the communities. From the conclusion that neither generalized unilingualism, neither generalized bilingualism, nor that 
non-territorial separation bring the solution, the author derives a package of four possible reforms that in his opinion would help to 
solve the communities- and Brussels-related problems. One of them being “to strengthen the linguistic significance of borders, while 
weakening their socio-economic importance” (ibid.:96) The here-mentioned principle of linguistic territorialism refers to John Stuart 
Mill‟s conception of multilingual democracies and his perception that in a country made up of different nationalities it is simply 
impossible to create one common public opinion which is necessary to produce a coherent government. (Mill 1861:196-197 in Van 
Parijs 2009:86-87) According to Van Parijs to makes things easy on all three language groups the public opinion and the entire 
preceding debate and common forum ideally ought to be generated in „the emerging first universal lingua franca‟ – hence English, 
overarching yet not replacing the principle of linguistic territoriality, an element that needs to be substantiated, shaped and formalized 
institutionally, among others by the electoral reforms at the regional level (make the Flemish community and the Walloon region two 
separate electoral districts; also make the region of Brussels a clear linguistically mixed electoral district allowing only linguistically 
mixed lists with securing a guaranteed representation for each language group (Flemish, French and German) as well as at the federal 
level (i.e. the creation of a federal election district for at least a certain number of the MPs (10% in the proposal of the Pavia group, cf. 
Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2007,2009). 
 20 
 
peace movement. Those were the answers to the rising New Right. The Catholic party officially fell apart in 
two separate regional parties: the Flemish CVP and the Walloon PSC. In the same year the ethno-regionalist 
and francophone Rassemblement Wallon (RW) was founded, campaigning for more socio-economic autonomy 
for Wallonia. (Swenden, Jans 2009:17) With the 1968 elections the Liberal party (still being the umbrella of 
the Flemish Partij voor de Vrijheid or PVV (Party for the Freedom) and Walloon Parti réformateur Liberal or 
PRL (Liberal reform Party)) managed to consolidate their electoral representation. The nationalist parties (cf. 
VU and FDF) however were once more significantly strengthened (+8% of the seat share). However, an 
unusual high level of 5,95% of the voters had wasted its vote to parties that did not manage to win a seat.  
 
3.6 The first and the second Belgian state reform: the second generation of extreme left and right party 
ideologies 
 
In 1969 a first pure and true consociational initiative to prepare the first state reform was taken by the catholic 
prime minister Gaston Eyskens and his minister of Community Affairs, Leo Tindemans, and supported by all 
other parties, including the regionalist parties. The context was that of the Working Group of the 28 
(„Werkgroep der 28‟ aka the working group-Eyskens), a platform of consultation installed to prepare the first 
Belgian state reform. (Eyskens 1993:809-810) The first Belgian state reform under the catholic-socialist 
cabinet Eyskens V dates from 1970 and made Belgium officially the sum of three separate culture 
communities (the Flemish, French and German community), with relatively limited competencies in cultural 
matters (only). Because the foundations were also placed for the later Flemish, Walloon and Brussels capital 
regional, on the national level Belgium was about to become a multi-level governed state (Velaers 2012:111). 
In this new constellation linguistic minority protection was key. Four protection mechanisms that are still 
applied today, were then installed. First of all, there is the linguistic parity in the council of ministers. 
Secondly, there is the institutionalized alarm bell procedure to protect the minority (language) group in the 
case of a potentially discriminatory constitutional or institutional reform.
70
 Thirdly, based on the special 
majority rules it requires three quarters of that group to launch the alarm bell procedure, suspending the 
parliamentary procedure with 30 days, a period in which the government needs to find a solution.
71
 And 
fourthly, since 1970 all members of the newly elected parliament need to confirm their membership of either 
the Flemish or French langue group.
72
 (Sinardet 2009:77)  
 
The strict separation of the political personnel into language groups and the obligation to govern together or 
the Belgian logic of separation and inclusion (cf. Deschouwer, Van Parijs 10-11) are considered by Dave 
Sinardet (2010:352) “the [constitutionalized] consequence of [institutionalized] negotiations conducted in the 
most consociational of traditions”.73 They have made Belgium a rather unique case in federalism. These 
evolutions have spurred the fragmentation of the national party landscape and have complicated federal 
political decision-making
74
 for at least two reasons. Firstly, because the outcome of the regionalization process 
of parties was that party elites  were spread over two linguistic group, it has increased rather than decreased 
both the inter-party (elite) competition within one region as well as the inter-regional tensions. Secondly, the 
presence of the so-called Bolt constitution (Grendelgrondwet) limited the powers of the majority of Flemings 
in a dramatic way (Deschouwer 2009:44), adding to the perceived democratic deficit at the national level. 
 
As seen the rise of the regionalist parties put the traditional state-wide Belgian parties under such a pressure 
that all of them broke up along the Flemish-Walloon linguistic line; and vice versa, “(…)the regional split of 
the Belgian party system increased the salience of the ethno-regionalist cleavage and thus created the 
conditions for federalism.” (Swenden, Jans 2009:17-18)  
 
As seen, the electoral support of the diametrically opposing Flemish VU and Brussels-based FDF had grown 
                                                 
70 The minority thus has a veto power. (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:11) 
71 Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009:11) indicate that the solution can either be one that is acceptable by both language groups or no 
solution at all, the case in which the government has to resign. 
72 “All „national‟ representatives have to be either Dutch-speaking or French speaking representatives: „the end result is a parliament in 
which the representatives are supposed to represent their own language group‟ (Deschouwer, 2006, p. 902).” (in: Sinardet 2010:352) 
73 [Additions] by the authors. This refers to the claim made bij Arend Lijphart calling Belgium “(…)the most thorough example of 
consociational democracy, the type of democracy that is most suitable for deeply divided societies.” (1981:1)  
74 “[For]most articles that define the political institutions of regions and communities, and for so-called Special Laws that implement 
these basic principles, a majority is needed in each language group, i.e. a concurrent majority, as well as an overall two thirds 
majority.” (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:11) 
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since 1965 until their electoral peak in 1974.
75
 But things were moving at the other side of the ideological 
spectrum as well. The increasing (academic and political) attention to the negative impact of the inflated 
capitalism, industrialization and production (cf. the first oil crisis of 1973-1974), the social and psychological 
pressures of economic development and the disappearance of the Communist Party have unlocked the door for 
new political initiatives such as the post-communist ultra-left wing AMADA („All powers to the workers‟ 
(Alle macht aan de arbeiders) (1970)) or the later left-ecologist political organizations such as AGALEV 
(Anders gaan leven) in Flanders (°1971, formally organized in 1973, first election in 1977) and Ecolo 
(Ecologistes Confédérés pour l'Organisation de Luttes Originales) in Wallonia (founded in 1978, first election 
in 1979 (European Parliament, zero candidates elected)). They were denominated as the New Left. Three years 
after the regionalization of the CVP/PSC, in 1971 the Liberal party also formally broke up into the Flemish 
PVV and the Walloon party PRL. However, unlike the VU and FDF that won the elections of 1971 and 1974 
the Liberal party was downgraded after the regionalization of the party in 1971. Both the Catholics and the 
liberals lost 8% of their national parliamentary representation. The new left won 11% of the total vote but that 
vote share did not translate in seat share (less than five percent!). Compared to the seven parliamentary parties 
in 1968, in 1971 a record number of sixteen different parties –still an all-time high- were represented in the 
national parliament. (Schamp, Devos 2012b:9, 12) An previously unseen 19,22% of the voters had switched 
from one party to another.  
 
As shown on the below graphs, at the beginning of the 1970s a growing share of the total party membership 
was owned by the nationalist parties, the socialist parties and to a lesser extent by the catholic parties. From 
the 1968 to the 1971 elections the liberal fraction experienced an extreme membership loss –both in absolute 
and in relative numbers. It would take the liberal parties a full decade to recover from that dip in partisanship 
and almost two decades to return to its electoral power it had known at the end of the 1960s. 
 
 
Share of the total number of party members (party membership share) per political family or ideology (own calculations based on Maes 
1988:169 and Quitenlier & Hooghe 2010:8). 
 
In theory heterogeneous parties like the VU are in general believed to “(…)be more committed to power as an 
end or an ideology, and therefore, readier to accept office in coalition.” (Rose 1969:29) On the other hand, 
quite typical for the so-called heterogeneous or across cleavages cutting based parties like the VU “(…)their 
cath-all nature makes them specially subject to fluctuations in strength, as coalitions can build up or collapse 
more quickly than with verzuiling or class-based parties.” (Rose, Urwin 1970:299) The combination of both 
was exactly what became a huge problem for the VU in the course of the second half of the 1970s. In 1977 the 
Flemish nationalist VU, FDF and the socialist party were part of the minority cabinet Tindemans II. While the 
catholic Tindemans was preparing the second state reform (cf. the Egmont pact of 1977-1978) some of the 
more radical VU partisans and their followers got frustrated. In their eyes their partaking in the government 
                                                 
75
About 20% of the Flemish vote went to the Volksunie (VU: 21 seats in 1971, 22 seats in 1974 and 20 seats in 1977), close to 40% of 
the vote in and around Brussels went to FDF, and close to 15% of the Walloon vote for MR. (Swenden, Jans 2009:17)  
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symbolized the rationalization for more Flemish autonomy, which was largely supported among Flemings. Yet 
a balance needed to be struck with the unitary francophone FDF. In Brussels the lingua franca more and more 
became the French, not only because of the growing sphere of influence of the capital in the surrounding 
Flemish communes but also because the occurrence of large groups of guest working immigrants and their 
families coming from Mediterranean countries like Morocco or Turkey, the large presence of EU officials and 
other foreigners. (Witte & Meynen 2006:180) No party was blind for the underdog position the Flemings were 
stuck in in the Brussels capital region and for the increased flamingantism, not even the Socialist party. 
Because of the inter-regionalist tensions the BSP split in 1978 into a Flemish part (Socialistische partij (SP)) 
and a Walloon part (Parti Socialiste (PS)). Around that same period the national post-communist AMADA 




In the period between 1974 and 1978 the Catholic party regained electoral weight. The imbalance in electoral 
weight between the traditional party families (the Catholic party family held +-35% of the seats, socialists held 
+-25% of the mandates, liberals and regionalists held +-15%) –which was not at all in line with the 
membership (base) of these parties- lead to the polarization and radicalization of party standpoints, especially 
those of the liberal fraction that since the early 1970s had been attracting new members more rapidly. The 
growth spurts of partisanship of the liberal parties PVV and PLP can be matched very easily with their 
involvement in the national cabinets Leburton I and II (1973-1974), Tindemans I (1974-1977) and Martens III 
(1980)
76
. Serious levels of political tension and instability resulted from that radicalization process which had 




The divergence of political positions was sharpened by the rather mild electoral loss of the VU in 1978 the 
Flemish nationalist party fell apart in a radical and a moderate wing. The radical wing had connected to the 
Flemish People‟s Party (Vlaamse Volkspartij (VVP)) that was formed in 1977 out of dissatisfaction with the 
Egmont pact. The VVP supported a conflict model rather than the consensus model which was typical for 
consociational democracies. The VVP, which was largely based in Brussels, was founded only some weeks 
later than the radical Flemish Nationalistic Party (Vlaams Nationale Partij (VNP)), based in Antwerp. Both 
initiatives were stressing factors of cultural, linguistic and national identity more than any other Flemish party. 
Eventually they joined forces and since the 1978 elections the VVP-VNP alliance presented joint candidate 
lists under the new name of the radical Flemish Blok (Vlaams Blok (VB)) (first parliamentary seat in 1978 for 
                                                 
76 The same trend was spotted even the case in the period 1981-1987 (Martens V, VI and VII), at the end of which the total 
membership of the liberal fraction reached its all time peak. 
77 “Between 1977 and 1981 there were no less than seven cabinets, all falling apart because they were not able to find an acceptable 
compromise about the institutional hardware of a new Belgium.” (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:7) In 1979 the young catholic Wilfried 




Karel Dillen, co-founder of VB). Since 1980 VB holds the credo “Own people first” (Eigen volk eerst!)78. 
According to Cas Mudde (2012) this attempt of becoming undeniably present is quite typical for populist 
radical extreme right parties
79
. With thirteen different parties elected into parliament in 1978 the Belgian party 
system experienced a reinforcement of its relative high levels of fractionalization. As a result the period was 
politically exceptionally turbulent and marked by heavy community-related tensions.
80
 The late 1970s were 
also marked by above average levels of electoral volatility and extreme low levels of wasted votes (hence, 
committed voting). 
 
The second oil crisis of 1979 justified the cause and the political relevance of the ecologist faction and 
increased the electoral and political resonance in so far that since their first representation after the 1977 
elections both Flemish AGALEV and Waloon Ecolo effectively adopted a state-wide political party structure 
in the late 1970s-early 1980s. Hence, contrary to all other parties at the national level the ecologist parties are 





In 1981 the minimum voting age for the legislative elections was lowered from 21 to 18 years. This way the 
electorate grew with 10% to 6,87 million Belgians. At that point +-70% of the total population were 
electorally franchised. Swyngedouw and Vander Weyden connect the definitive downturn of the Flemish CVP 
of the same year to the reduction of the voting age. (2006:216) Nonetheless, until the 1999 elections –won by 
the liberal Guy Verhofstadt- the catholic party family succeeded in delivering the prime minister without 
interruption. Subsequent growth of the electorate for the national parliamentary elections has been due to the 
so-called social population growth, i.e. a net migration saldo (Schamp, Devos 2012:515), hence not to specific 
electoral reforms. (cf. graph above) 
 
With the second Belgian state reform of 1980-1981 under the leadership of the Catholic prime minister 
Wilfried Martens (the catholic-socialist government Martens II, III and IV) Belgium became a true federal 
state with equal constitutional rights between the Flemish, the Walloon and the German communities (just 
communities, not longer „culture communities‟), the Flemish and the Walloon regions and the federal level. 
Each community installed a parliament (or council) and a government. The organization of the third region of 
Brussels capital –though recognized in 1970- had to wait until the next state reform in 1988. The new federal 
structure required conciliation between the regional and the federal bodies. But that conciliation was largely 
                                                 
78 The VB was basically a reaction to the way the former Volksunie was trying to become incontournable and staying involved in the 
production of typical Belgian political compromises between Flemings and Walloons that were de facto considered by hardliner 
nationalists as suboptimal for Flemings. 
79 Mudde (2012:223) investigated three decennia of populist radical-right politics in West-Europe, a.o. Vlaams Belang (VB) and Front 
National (FN) in Belgium. 
80 “(…)between 1977 and 1981 there were no less than seven cabinets, all falling apart because they were not able to find an 
acceptable compromise about the institutional hardware of a new Belgium.” (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:7) 
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based on the waffle iron politics “(...)whereby alleged benefits for one language group had to be matched by 
commensurate benefits for the other group.” (Swenden, Jans 2009:26) The consequence of this financing 
practice however was that one of the two regions always risked to receive more money than necessary, hence 
increasing the total state debt to 100% of the BBP. 
 
When looking at the evolution of the relative membership base of the largest party families or ideologies than 
the rise in the 1980s of the Catholic and nationalist and regionalist parties is very clear. The political divide 
between Flanders (mostly catholic and nationalistic), Wallonia (more than average socialist) and Brussels 
(more than elsewhere liberal)
 81
 was still ideology-centered. The divide goes back until the end of WWI (cf. 
supra) and had been reinstituted in full force since the early preparations of the first state reform in the late 
1960s. The tensions however culminated after the second state reform. The political divide sharpened the 
regionalist sentiments (cf. increase in activism and partisanship of VU, VB and FDF) – sentiments that also 
grew among the radicals among the French-speaking part of Belgium. In 1984-‟85 this lead to a new political 
initiative: the (francophone) National Front party (Front National (FN)), largely inspired by the French 
extreme right Front National lead by Jean-Marie Le Pen. (van Haute 2012:219) Also, because of the economic 
crisis that loomed over the European mainland and the endless row of (political) scandals putting Belgium on 
the international front news for several years
82
, anti-system or anti-establishment parties like the Flemish 
Block and Jean-Pierre Van Rossem‟s libertarian party R.O.S.S.E.M. in Flanders received a lot of media 
attention. (Devos, C., 2006: 294-295)  
 
3.7 The „new politics culture‟ politics and the denial of voter  
 
There‟s a general trend in the late 1980s and 1990s of relative increasing total electoral volatility (Blomme et 
al. 2009) and more national voter mobility and total vote transfers (Swyngedouw 2009) Together with the 
increased electoral volatility, the total share of wasted votes –i.e. votes casted for parties that were not 
successful in entering the parliament after all- grew significantly since the 1980s. But more importantly, since 
the late 1980s the character of the wasted vote changed significantly. Wasted votes more often became 
„protest‟ votes, aimed against the political practices rather than for.   
 
The growing distrust in politicians added to the polarization between traditional power-addicted parties and the 
more radical and populist „anti-„parties against whom the traditional parties swiftly built a cordon sanitaire to 
keep them from power and policy-making (cf. against the Flemish Blok in 1989). On its turn the rising number 
of protest voters, who were extra motivated by what they perceived to be largely undemocratic practices of 
segregation and exclusion of winning parties, had triggered many other  parties in the 1990s to „give it a try‟. 
And, hence, the working of the political system in itself has sustained the unwanted and detrimental 
multiplication of new political parties (Pilet 2012:430-431). Such parties are often labeled in very different 
ways
83
 but they all share one feature: they added to the intra-party system hostility and to the total inter-party 
competition. The perceived widening gap between politics and the citizen and between the citizen and the 
intermediary structures as well as the perceived erosion of the traditional parties required and justified a 
culture of new politics (NPC). As we will see, the NPC would lead to the rejuvenation of all traditional parties 
in the 1990s and 2000s. But instead of realigning politics and citizens that process again confused rather than 
reassured the (overall aging) electorate. But the institutional reform of the Belgian state too added to the 
political instability of the country. 
 
The third Belgian state reform of 1988 and 1989 marked the official end of the waffle iron politics. The 
regions became largely responsible for their own expenses. Ever since then Belgian politics were framed in 
territorial terms, the conception of a „confederal Belgium‟ was on virtually every politician‟s mind, especially 
                                                 
81 The Catholic party (CVP, later CD&V) receiving 15,2% to 30,7% of the total vote in Flanders (representing on average 3,67% more 
vote share than compared to the total nation-wide votes share (min-max: 1,4%-7,6%)), the Socialist party (PS) receiving 23,8% to 
37,9% of the total vote in Wallonia (representing on average 8,76% more vote share than compared to the total nation-wide votes share 
(min-max: 6,2%-11,3%)), and the Liberal party (MR and Open VLD) receiving 21,1% to 27,8% of the total vote in Brussels 
(representing on average 5,57% more vote share than compared to the total nation-wide votes share (min-max: 3,7%-8,3%)). (based on 
data provided by Matagne & Verjans 2012: 91,95) 
82 These scandals include a.o. the series of unsolved robberies by the Bende van Nijvel (1982-„85), the Agusta helicopter kickback 
scandal (1988-„89), the kidnapping of Vanden Boeynants (1989), the murder of André Cools (1991) –most of them involving directly 
or indirectly highly ranked functionaries of the socialist party family-. 
83 Single issue parties, theme parties, business firm parties, modern cadre parties or electoral professional parties. 
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on the mind of the Flemish nationalists of VB.
84
 Also a Law on party finance and the control of electoral 
expense (1989) was voted entitling all political parties or fractions that are represented in the legislative to 
receive state funding based on the size of their representation (i.e. number of seats taken). Because of a 
difference of meaning on a wrongly issued export license to Belgium‟s gun-making company Fabrique 
Nationale de Herstal (FN), by the end of September 1991 the pacifist wing of the VU forced the Flemish 
nationalists out of the government Martens VIII (1988-1991), lead by the catholic Wilfried Martens. With still 
thirteen parties elected in national parliament the party diversity after the federal elections of 24 November 
1991 reached once again above average levels.  
 
In those 1991 federal elections the radical-right and Flemish nationalistic VB won ten seats whereas the more 
moderate VU lost six, indicating a broader acceptance of the hardened anti-foreigners discourse spread by the 
VB. Because more than ten percent of the Flemings and six percent of the voters in constituency of Brussels-
Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) voted for the right-radical, anti-Belgian and anti-immigrant viewpoints of the populist 
VB and because more than five percent of the Flemish electorate and 2,3% of the voters in BHV voted for the 
ultra-libertarian and republican party R.O.S.S.E.M, the 1991 national elections „traumatized‟ the traditional 
parties, not to mention the left parties Agalev and PVDA. The sudden electoral success of VB clearly signaled 
a significant disapproval by a substantial part of the Flamingant and the Flemish voters of the position taken 
by the VU and of the way politics were run by the traditional parties. Election day lives on in the public 
memory as Black Sunday („Zwarte Zondag‟) for more than one reason. Obviously the most important reason is 
the triumph of the radical right VB. Secondly, the election outcome meant the official end of the cabinet of 
Martens VIII and of the reign of the traditional parties‟ politics. The change caused the traditional parties to 
undertake two concrete actions. The cordon sanitaire („cordon‟) that the traditional Flemish parties CVP, SP, 
PVV, VU and the green party had erected against the so-called fascist and undemocratic VB in 1989 was 
renewed and reinforced. (Schamp 2013) In this way the traditional parties and the ecologists were hoping to 
save their own strayed „electoral souls‟85. Thirdly, the mainstream parties understood that the time of thorough 
party-introspection had arrived. In that context, Swenden and Jans argued that at the time the consociational 
and anti-majoritarian devices that operated at the national (and sub-national) level might have functioned as 
significant institutional shock-absorbers. (2009:28) 
 
After the 1991 elections the Flemish liberals were kept out of the government formation talks and were the 
first to reconsider their political project. As a result of that introspection the party‟s name was changed into 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD) – Party of the Citizen). Putting 
„Flemish‟ in the part‟s name was in a way strategic. The CVP-led mirror cabinet led by Jean-Luc Dehaene of 
catholic and socialist ministers stayed in power. The first proposals of the government Dehaene I was to 
evaluate and transform the electoral system in such a way that reform would put an end to the seemingly 
unbridled multiplication of parties. Despite those intentions to recalibrate the national party system, more new 
political initiatives saw the light at the beginning of the 1990s. At the same time the VU disappeared further 




The fourth Belgian state reform of 1993 resulted in the regionalization of the legislative and governmental 
structure including the conception of a Flemish parliament, a Walloon parliament and a parliament of the 
Brussels Capital region. The regional parliaments were elected in 1995 for the first time. The institutional 
reform lead to a reduction of the number of seats in the federal the Chamber of Representatives from 212 to 
150 seats and to a decrease of the number of electoral districts from 30 (since 1900) to 20 – but the operation 
resulted in a doubling of the total number of (regional and federal) parliamentary mandates in Belgium (from 
212 to 438!)
 87
. The redistricting lead to a relatively modest expansion of the average district magnitude from 
7,1 (since 1973) to 7,5. At the federal level Dehaene I was followed up by Dehaene II and all seemed well for 
the red-Roman cabinet of CVP/PSC and SP/PS.  
 
                                                 
84 Cf. Van Houten (2004) in: Swenden, Jans 2009:27-28. 
85 VB officials like Filip Dewinter and Jurgen Ceder were at the time most renown for their anti-Belgian convictions and for the 
solution of the problem that foreigners in their eyes posed. The solution included a list of 70 proposals to send back –forcefully if 
needed- non-Flemings in order to protect the Flemish culture and identity. The plan was refined in 1996 but renounced by the party top 
because it had become irrelevant. (source: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/70_puntenplan)  
86 Part of the explanation is in the great electoral losses (five seat in 1995, eight seats in 1999). The VU was not able to restore the 
successes of the first half of the 1970s. 
87 Including the 150 seats in the federal parliament, 124 seats in the Flemish regional parliament, 89 seats in the parliament of the 
Brussels‟ region, and 75 seats in the Walloon regional parliament. 
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However, the outbreak of the dioxin crisis in 1999 caused the fall of Dehaene II. After the elections later on 
the same year both the CVP and the PS booked a dramatic electoral loss. Not surprisingly the green parties 
booked an electoral success in the following federal elections. After all, environmental care, food safety, 
animal rights etcetera are among the issues an concerns that Flemish and Walloon ecologists stand for. As a 
result of their substantial electoral support both AGALEV (nine seats or 6,99% of the vote) and Ecolo (11 
seats or 7,36% of the total vote) were invited to be part of the first ever purple-green federal government under 
the leadership of the already mentioned flamboyant Guy Verhofstadt. It was the first liberal lead cabinet since 
the government lead by Paul-Emile Janson (1937-1938) in between the two wars. 
 
3.8 The fifth and the sixth Belgian state reform: electoral reform, the cartelization of party politics and 
the fight for the median voter 
 
As a part of the fifth Belgian state reform the federal competences and powers were further regionalized. 
Recent changes of the electoral institutions and laws were included, like the reduction of the list vote by half 
of the weight (2001-2002)
 88
. This devolution of the list vote makes it easier for lower ranked candidates of a 
list to leapfrog a higher placed candidate. Secondly, the 20 arrondissemental electoral districts were replaced 
by eleven (larger) provincial districts. This resulted in a significant increase of the average DM to 13,6.
89
 And, 
thirdly, a five percent electoral threshold at the provincial level was installed for the election of the federal 




Since the 2003 national elections parties present one candidate list per province. Hence, the score of that party 
list only will determine the outcome of the seat distribution (application of the system-D‟Hondt) and the 
appointment of candidates. This way the system of list connection and subsequent apparenting at the 
provincial level (cf. supra) became obsolete and disappeared (though there was one exception
91
). Though the 
occurrence of larger districts would in fact trigger new political groups to attempt to win a seat in the 
parliamentary elections, the effect of the electoral threshold at the provincial level aimed to dissuade these new 
parties from participating in the electoral battle. The end result of the electoral reform in terms of the effect on 
the inter-party strategies and competition or on the overall fragmentation of the federal party landscape has 
therefore been mixed. Yet the electoral reform –including the new rules for (limiting) the funding of electoral 
campaigning
92
- has brought about a new phenomenon to Belgian national politics: the phenomenon of making 
inter-party alliances and cartelization, i.e. political parties joining forces and presenting candidates of more 
than one party on one candidate list.  
 
Other changes of the electoral rules for the federal parliamentary election were: firstly, the introduction of a 
50/50 parity of female and male candidates (and followers) on each party list (thus also on incomplete lists
93
), 
secondly, the elimination of the (federal-regional) double mandate
94
 and, thirdly, the possibility to cast more 
than one vote for candidates and followers within one and the same list (= multiple vote). (Swyngedouw & 
                                                 
88 Federale Voorlichtingsdienst, „Nieuwe wetsinitiatieven inzake de verkiezingen (Kamer – Senaat) op zondag 18 mei 2003‟, versie 16 
april 2003, p. 2. These electoral reforms were published in the Belgisch Staatsblad (BS) on January, 10th 2003. 
89 The distribution of seats over all provinces was based on the population number of each province (cf. the census of October, 1st 
2001) (Royal Decree of 22 January 2003 (BS 1/02/2003)). The only two exceptions to the status quo of the number of seats are the 
absolute decrease from 7 to 6 seats in the province of Namur and the increase from 18 to 19 seats in the province if Henegouwen 
(Hainaut). The electoral district B-H-V was split in 2012. 
90 Law of 13 December 2002 changing the electoral Code and its annex and the law of 13 December 2002 changing the electoral 
legislation in several ways (BS 10/01/2003). 
91
 Until the 2010 national elections apparenting was possible in the constituency of Brussels-Halle –Vilvoorde (BHV) for party lists 
that were connected with lists of the constituency of Louvain (kieskring Leuven) in the province of Flemish Brabant or the constituency 
of Nivelles (kieskring Nijvel) in the province of Walloon Brabant. Since the split of the constituency of BHV (13 July 2012) and the 
creation of two new provincial electoral districts –Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant- list connection is no longer possible. 
92 Law of 2 April 2003 introducing a new table with allowed maximum expenses per district per party and candidate. (Federale 
Voorlichtingsdienst, „Nieuwe wetsinitiatieven inzake de verkiezingen (Kamer – Senaat) op zondag 18 mei 2003‟, versie 16 april 2003, 
p. 5) (BS 16/04/2003) 
93 Law of 18 July 2002 guaranteeing the equal representation of men and women on candidate lists (BD 28/08/2002). Complete lists of 
effective candidates contain maximally the number of seats to be filled in the provincial district (for instance 24 in Antwerp and four in 
Luxemburg). The maximum number of followers on each list is half of the number of effective candidates plus one, with a minimum of 
six (for instance 13 in Antwerp and six in Luxemburg). For a practical example of the 2010 elections: 
http://www.verkiezingen2010.belgium.be/nl/cha/preferred/preferred_top.html 
94 Since the 2003 elections candidates that are elected for both the Chamber and the Senate need to make a choice within three days 
after the election. The seat not-taken was filled by the first follower on the list. 
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Vander Weyden 2006:202).  
 
Recent changes at the level of the national party system include the split in 2001 of the Volksunie (VU) in 
three separate groups of which the conservative right-wing New-Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
(N-VA)) under the leadership of Geert Bourgeois and the social-progressive left-wing party Spirit
95
 under the 
leadership of Geert Lambert were electorally speaking the most relevant and politically speaking also most 
viable successors of the VU. A third group of old-VU-members wanted to continue (Doe voort!) but 
eventually they were scattered all over the Flemish political landscape. In the same year the CVP was given 
another name, Christian-Democratic & Flemish (CD&V). Here too, the suffix „Flemish‟ had a strategic 
meaning, aiming at winning back the Flemish-nationalist voter. One year later the Flemish socialist party 
renamed itself Social Progressive Alternative (SP.anders (SP.a)) and the Walloon PSC converted into Centre 
démocrate Humaniste (CdH).  
 
After the 2003 federal elections, AGALEV changed its name into Groen! after losing all its parliamentary 
seats in the elections –a direct result of the electoral threshold that the green parties had voted for. The 
following year the liberal VLD changed its name into Open-VLD
96
, SP.a and Spirit formed a (temporary) 
kartel, and N-VA and CD&V formed a (temporary) kartel. VB became Vlaams Belang after a juridical decree 
that the party could no longer use the original name Vlaams Blok due to anti-semitic and anti-democratic 
statements linked to the „old VB‟. The frequent name changes in the years 2001 to 200497 underlined another 
important trend in Belgian national politics, namely the rejuvenation of politics. A new generation of party 
leaders (for instance Guy Verhofstadt (Open VLD), Steve Stevaert (Sp.a), Joëlle Millequet (CdH), and Stefaan 
De Clercq (CD&V)) broke with the old-fashioned style of the so-called „old crocodiles‟. 
 
In 2006 a new Flemish right-wing, liberal party Lijst Dedecker (LDD) was founded around its populist leader 
and former coach of the national judo team, Jean-Marie Dedecker. Dedecker was first banned out of the liberal 
party VLD in November 2004 after a neck-on-neck race for the presidential elections of the VLD and the 
many internal tensions the strongly polarized elections had caused, and later disavowed by the CD&V that was 
in kartel with N-VA, who‟s fresh elected president, Bart De Wever, decided to take Dedecker on board of the 
party. The Christian-democrat leader, Yves Leterme, however saw no space for Dedecker in the kartel and he 
broke up the alliance with N-VA. After Dedecker had been dumped for the second time in one year CD&V 
and N-VA reestablished their Flemish center-right alliance. Strengthened by the surprisingly large support 
received for the VLD‟s president‟s elections, Dedecker decided to participate in the June 2007 elections with 
his own party, LDD. At the 2007 federal elections the newcomer received an remarkable 6,5% of the total vote 
(i.e. five of the 150 seats)
98
. Though capable of stealing in parts of the VB electorate, LDD –a party showing 
characteristics of the business firm party, the kartel party, and the „old‟ cadre party (cf. Put 2012:20)- has not 
been capable to consolidate its organization and its electoral score. After the 2010 defeat (only one seat at the 
moment), LDD was renamed in 2011 (Liberaal, Direct & Democratisch). Contrary to N-VA, the 2012 local 





Not to mention the many leadership changes, the intra-party fights, the party splits of the past two decades, 
how doe stheory explain this long list of party system dynamics and party changes taking place in less than 
one decade? Regarding the collaboration between parties and the kartellization process, Peter Mair, who 
studied cross-party friendliness (1990:140) based on prior positive inter-party collaborations for instance at 
the local or the European level, attempted to explain the reasons why initially competitive parties at specific 
points in time would actually bundle their forces and present themselves to the electorate as one kartel-list, for 
instance for elections at the regional of the federal level. In Flanders such kartels –not mergers- were quite 
successful at the short term and proved positive for most of the parties involved (e.g. CD&V-N-VA, Sp.a-
Spirit, Open-VLD-Vivant). However, when programmatic issues popped-up is became all too clear that kartels 
                                                 
95 Meaning „Sociaal Progressief Internationaal Regionalistisch Integraal-democratisch en Toekomstgericht’ or else the Future Group 
(Toekomstgroep). In 2008 Spirit changed its name to Vlaams-Progressieven (Vl.Pro) and in 2009 once more to SLP (Sociaal-Liberale 
Partij). By the end of 2009 the left-liberals of SLP joined up with with the Flemish ecologist party Groen!. 
96 This name change was linked to the incorporation of the Liberaal Appél into the VLD. For the 2006 regional elections Open VLD 
formed a kartel with the right-libertarian party Vivant (that received 2,1% of the vote in the 1999 federal elections, and 1,3% of the 
vote at the 2003 federal elections). 
97
 Blomme et al. 2008:20. 
98 LDD also won one seat in the Senate. 
99 Cf. De Vadder, I. (2013). Wie maakte de N-VA groot?, Opiniestuk, www.deredactie.be, 21/03/2013. 
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were built on quick sand and it became all too clear too soon that these virtual partnerships could not stand the 
intra-kartel frictions for a long time.  
 
Since the 2003 elections, the kartels had split one after the other after one or two elections. N-VA being the 
exception to the rule
100
, the broad outcome of the kartellization has been the significant electoral loss of the  
traditional parties (CD&V, Sp.a and Open-VLD) and the acquisition of other parties (like Spirit or Vivant) by 
parties like Groen! and Open-VLD, because the acquired parties were not capable of jumping the electoral 
threshold in none of the electoral districts on their own strength. The recent kartel experiment in Belgian 
politics seems to confirm Mair‟s empirical findings about the electoral gain and loss following either a merger 
or a diffusion of parties (1990:135)
 101
: the kartel formula appeared useful at the short term but proved 
disastrous in most cases when the intended collaboration breaks down. 
 
3.9  A democratic equilibrium and the optimal representation of party ideologies 
 
According to Matagne and Verjans (2012:87) looking at the election results in a longitudinal way enables one 
to spot more general trends as well as the more detailed evolution of the three traditional political families and 
of all other political factions (regionalists, green parties,…) and ruling coalition(s). With respect to the 
development of the Belgian national party system and the democratic representation since the last quarter of 
the 19
th
 century the graph plotting the electoral positions of the respective parties in the Belgium party system 
adds in many ways to the evidence supporting Grumm‟s proclaimed progression towards a relative electoral 
equilibrium. At the one hand the three classic or traditional ideologies or party families (the Catholics, the 
liberals and the socialists) have grown to rather similar levels of representation… but only from the mid-1960s 
onwards. On the other hand, apart from one exception (N-VA after the 2010 elections), the non-traditional 
regionalist, green, extreme-right and left parties have not grown much over time and are in general still 
considerably smaller than the traditional parties, both in terms of electoral support as in terms of parliamentary 
representation. More to it, the traditional parties have a strong local base which is certainly reflecting a share 
of the electoral support experienced by those parties at other electoral levels as well, in casu the federal level. 
At the eve of the October 2012 local and provincial elections N-VA was largely missing such a local 
stronghold but the party lived up to the general expectation and anchored itself successfully. Since N-VA 
successfully established a dominant politically relevant representation at the local and provincial level, in 
theory a second growth spurt of N-VA with the 2014 national elections is to be expected.  
 
To summarize Belgium‟s political and electoral history in one paragraph: Belgium has experienced several 
cleavage-based conflicts such as a severe church-state conflict (from 1830 to 1958), a sharp class conflict 
(from 1880 to 1920) and the linguistic-territorial conflict between Flemings and Walloons (from the 1950s to 
the present). (Nordlinger in Guelke 2012:19) Yet, in the aftermath of such fundamental changes, according to 
Lijphart, multiparty systems like the Belgian one, have nevertheless proven to be stable democracies. 
(1968:14) Still, since the late 1960s Belgium has suffered at least two important political changes of a rather 
revolutionary type. Firstly, the parties themselves have traded their stable national electoral bases for a number 
of regionalized volatile electoral subgroups. In fact, the absence of one national or federal electoral district 
allowing the election of a certain number of seats in a higher tier (cf. two-tier districting), has made Belgium 
the sum of two singular regionalized representative democracies, barely united at the federal level.
102
 As a 
result the country has traded its largely uncomplicated ideology-based, polarized and pillarized party system 
for a complex multitude of medium-sized and smaller regionalized parties with different political agendas, 
different (elite) styles, different organizations, different networks or societal embedding (multi-partism) and so 
on. The competition with upcoming post-modern ideologies and factions like the leftist green or Marxist 
faction in the 1970s and the rightist libertarian factions in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in lower adherence to 
the „old-fashioned‟ ideologies of the three traditional party families, called partisan de-alignment or 
                                                 
100 Having left the kartel with CD&V in the autumn of 2008, the Flemish N-VA since 2004 lead by Bart De Wever came out as the 
winner of the 2010 federal elections, with 17,4% of the popular vote. More to it, N-VA became the largest political faction in the 
federal parliament with 27 of the 150 seats (18% of the seat share). Together with VB (12 seats) the Flemish family of regionalists hold 
26% of the seats and has become as big as the socialist family (SP.a holds 13 seats and the PS 26 seats). The Christian-democratic and 
liberal blocs are somewhat equally represented (17-20% of the seats) and the ecologist or green faction has about 10% of the seats. (cf. 
Annex 3: overview of the factional representation in the Belgian federal parliament) 
101 “More precisely, even though the numbers of gainers and losers in each group more or less balances out, it is clear that when 
merged parties lose they tend to lose more than when splintered parties lose, (…) And when merged parties gain they tend to gain less 
than when splintered parties gain (…). It is in this sense that fission tends to prove more profitable than fusion.” (Mair 1990:135) 
102 In fact next to the Flemish and Walloon regional parliamentary democracies there is the bilingual democracy of the Brussels capital 
region where the electorate can vote for Flemish or Walloon lists and candidates.  
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detachment. Both factors have lead to the electoral devolution of the traditional state-parties and the 
incumbency of several peripheral parties that are „by definition‟ geographically concentrated. (Alonso 
2012:52) Secondly, as in most other European countries, because of the progressive depillarization and 
partisan de-alignment, because of the personalization of individual politicians by more independent media and 
the personification of politics shown not only in the ways in which parties select their candidates but also in 
the reduction of the weight of the list vote (in 2002), and because of the increasing unpredictability of 
elections, all political parties are said to be in decline.  
 
Since the introduction of the PC forty years ago and of the internet twenty years ago technological innovations 
and the media have changed the ways in which people communicate in general and of the way people do 
politics in particularly. Media have become more open and therefore less docile to one or the pother ideology 
or party. Live streaming from inside the parliament, instant messaging via Twitter, Facebook and through 
other social network sites has increased the political understanding and insight. However, the downside of the 
informatization of politics is that (personal) visibility (who gets air play?) and accountability (who done it?) of 
the political personnel have replaced tradition as the main driver to vote for a party (or its central ideology) or 
to decide to become a member of that party. In a way voters have become potential stakeholders of each and 
every party. The process of mediatization –again reinforcing the personification of politics- has supported 
higher degrees of de-alignment, partisan detachment and volatile voter behavior. (Devos et al. 2009:15-20) 
The end result of this evolution has been a clear diversification in political and voter preferences, symbolized 
by the volatile voter or the party-less voter.
103
 In many cases electoral volatility and party de-alignment leads 
to radicalization and the re-politicization of initially loosely connected opinions. In the case of Belgium, next 
to the societal and  technological evolution there is the specific historical and institutional evolution: since 
1963 the political system and the re-organization of the country in two language areas divided by an invisible 
„language border‟ drawn across the territory. The result of this was the regionalization of the state-based or 
nationwide parties into a Flemish and a Walloon party (1968-1978), the communautarization of political 
agendas, and the strong revival of the nationalistic and regional sentiments. These factors combined have 
spurred a new phase in the complicating of the already highly fractionalized Belgian political and party 
system, i.e. an inflation of the number of (regional) electoral and parliamentary parties each one of them 
aiming to answer one or the other timely desire or fancy want (ibid.:20-21). Since the democratization of the 
parliamentary elections in the late 1800s, “[the] North and South of the country returned quite different 
results” and “(…)the two parts of the country still display significantly different electoral behavior.” 
(Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:9)  
 
Even though the question arises what the representative function of parties anno 2012 exactly is and though 
the critique on the value of P.R.-based representative democracy, it is generally accepted that “democracy is 
unthinkable without political parties”104 or that “popular democracy fails when parties fail”. (Mair 2006:10; 
Devos et al. 2009:15) More to it, in the case of Belgium at least (but in many other countries as well) the party 
system that is supposedly in crisis has produced several new political parties (the so-called New Politics 
parties) both at the left and at the right end of the ideological spectrum and with mixed success. Therefore, we 
tend to agree that “[the] crisis concerns more a type of party rather than the party per se” (Ignazi 1996:549) 




In this article we presented a historic account of the election results for the national legislative in Belgium. A 
descriptive statistical analysis of long-term time series of representation and proportionality, i.e. analyzing 
trends of the vote share versus seat share data, the number of electoral and parliamentary parties, and the 
representativeness of the parliamentary democracy. In this paper the relationship between the Belgian electoral 
system and the party system was studied based on the nationally aggregated election outcomes of parties and 
party families and factions in the Chamber of Representatives (1900-2010). We studied the historic 
development of the size of the national parliament, the number and size of the electoral districts , the number 
                                                 
103 Cf. Russell Dalton in „Wie wil er nu nog een partijkaart?‟, Knack, 15 augustus 2012, p. 47. 
104 Cf. Elmer Eric Schattschneider‟s view on the position and relevance of parties dating from the early 1940s, namely that: “[political] 
parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.” (1942:1) However, Schattschneider had 
Amarican parties in mind, not European and as Andeweg clarifies it is perfectly arguable that political parties on the European 
mainland are a different breed, because they share a different origin (cf. social cleavages and the dominance of the mass party as 
central organizing principle) than American parties.   
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of electoral and electoral strength of the parliamentary parties (i.e. the complexity of the party system and the 
inter-party competition). In this part we have done so in a historically descriptive way describing the context 
of electoral reforms such as the democratization of the suffrage, measures affecting the proportional 
representation and so on. The contextualization allowed for insight in the nature of the inter-party competition 
in certain time periods, the electoral party strategies, or time effects. In the next part we will look at the 
association of the drivers of the subsequent electoral reforms and the changes of the national party system. 
 
Summarizing Belgium‟s party system evolution, the above graphs show that apart from the exceptional pre-
WWII election years 1936 and 1939, the period between the introduction of the general male suffrage and the 
early 1960s was a period of electoral consolidation, with relative low levels of party system fractionalization 
in terms of electoral and parliamentary parties. The big shake-up of the Belgian party system clearly came 
with the 1965 national elections, the outcome of which was in fact the prologue of the institutional and 
constitutional problems surrounding the first state reform (1970). Since then the Belgian national and 
subsequently federalized party system has become more and more multifarious characterized by an inter-party 
and intra-party competition that increased exponentially with just about each next election. Parties nowadays 
are evaluated by the electorate in a more insightful and intuitive way than half a century ago. The perception 
of party strength is no longer related to the number of party members, party activists, controlled media but on 
the falling in line of the voters‟ personal beliefs or preferences, media coverage (of party members and 
political personnel), strong leadership in the party‟s policy formation and on personal accountability of 
politicians. Because of the changing structure, nature and face of Belgian politics inter- and intraparty 
competition have risen – certainly at the federal level where basically two different communities delegate 
representatives in one (national) parliament, based on the choice to belong to the Dutch-speaking or French-
speaking language group which each representative has to make when sworn in
105
. It is this choice between the 
Dutch or the French language groups  to be made by any candidate of a Flemish or a Walloon party before the 
elections as well as after the elections in the case of a representative elected in the electoral district B-H-V that 
since 1970 determined the actual number of representatives of each region (Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels 
capital region)
106
. This way the neat separation between the language groups is guaranteed and as a 
consequence not a single politician formally represents voters outside of his or her language group. 
(Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:11) 
 
In 2010 the largest party in the Belgian federal parliament (N-VA) obtained 18% of the 150 seats. Today there 
are twelve parties represented at that level. That is 20% more parties compared to the previous federal election 
of 2007. Huge doses of so-called political craftsmanship, willingness and courage were needed to bring about 
a government accord (with eight parties involved) and to establish a federal government (with six parties 
involved) after 541 days of „formation talks‟ –a world record at that time.107 In neither bringing about the 
government accord nor the federal government itself N-VA had been involved. Because N-VA is a coalition 
partner of the socialist and Christian-democratic parties at the regional Flemish level, the both governments 
are politically incongruent. At the other side of the language border the Walloon government is a coalition of 
socialist, Christian democrat and ecologists and incongruent too with the federal government. The government 
of the region of Brussels (i.e. a coalition between the Walloon socialist party, the Flemish liberal party, the 
Christian-democratic parties and the ecologist parties) too is largely incongruent with the composition of the 
federal government (i.e. what is called a classic tri-partite of both Flemish and Walloon catholic, socialist and 
liberal parties). Such federal-regional coalition incongruence sharpens political asymmetries caused by a 
bipolar Flanders-Walloon constellation. (Swenden, Jans 2009:20-22) More to it, the federal government today 
is not backed by a majority of the Flemish voters and the prime minister is Walloon –notwithstanding the fact 
that the party leader of N-VA received 600 thousand preference votes in the 2010 elections. Because of the 
perception of a certain degree of denial of the Flemish majority at the federal level, the problem of Belgium 
seems to be foremost its democratic institution. In relation to the representation of the political factions, it 
looks like the effect of the electoral threshold of 5% (2002) has already gone. Highly fractionalized party 
systems do not tend to defractionalize easily (cf. „it is difficult to send the rascals packing‟ (Pinto-Duschinsky 
                                                 
105 In fact for Flemish and Walloon representatives that language group membership “(…)is defined by the territory in which the 
members of parliament have been elected. (…) For MPs elected in the central B-H-V district the language in which they take their oath 
defines the group to which they belong.” (Deschouwer, Van Parijs 2009:10)  
106 For an overview of the number of representatives per region in the national parliament in the period 1946-2003 see Alonso 





(1999) in Farrell 2001:197). Together with Richard Katz we wonder whether or not the next electoral reform 
will cope with the question of “who we are [as a nation], where we are [as a democracy] and where we want to 
go [as a state]”. (1997:308, […] added by the author)108   
 
Like all five previous reforms the ongoing sixth state reform (2011-2012) has not been successful in 
decommunautarizing Belgian politics and could mean the bridge too far for consociation-based politics. Most 
likely politicians will continue to do what they have done since the first state reform in 1970: finding short-
term solutions for long-term problems. In order to further adjust the political system to the reality of the two-
democracies based federal party system it seems logic to make more small incremental changes in the electoral 
system. Whether this means the introduction of more hurdles (like the increase of the five percent electoral 
threshold (to ten percent?), the further devolution of the list vote (to one third of the total number of valid 
casted list votes?), the complete abolishment of the apparentement system (in all provinces), or the 
introduction of a federal electoral district (for at least 10% of the parliamentary seats?) and so on), however, is 
yet to be seen. The alternative route towards the de-federation of Belgium is more certain as the support for the 
idea has gained wide support in Flanders since 2007 and actually sustain the hypothesis of a country 
comprising two democracies. (Pilet, J.-B. 2012b:44) 
 
In the next parts of this article series, we will discuss a handful of aspects of the historical study of the Belgian 
electoral and party system change more in detail. First of all, in the next part, we will concentrate on the 
relevance of the statistical and historiographic approach of this line of research. Also a set of intuitive but 
central assumptions regarding electoral reform, social movement and party system dynamics will be 
developed. These theoretic statements will be used to further analyze the association between the process of 
democratization of the electoral system and the development of the party system in Belgium. In another part 
we will look at the impact of the discerned electoral reforms, proportionality of the representation, electoral 
volatility on the party system organization. In the last part we look at the issue whether or not this approach 
helps us to understand the current political instability. At the end of the last part of this article series the 
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APPENDIX : Aggregated electoral strength of the traditional, modern and mainstream post-modern party 












Green faction Extreme left 
faction 
1847 50,00 50,00         
1848 23,15 76,85         
1850 36,11 63,89         
1852 47,22 52,78         
1854 50,00 50,00         
1856 53,85 46,15         
1857 35,19 64,81         
1859 40,52 59,48         
1861 43,10 56,90         
1863 49,14 50,86         
1864 44,83 55,17         
1866 42,62 57,38         
1868 40,98 59,02         
1870 I 50,00 50,00         
1870 II 58,06 41,94         
1872 57,26 42,74         
1874 54,84 45,16         
1878 45,45 54,55         
1882 42,75 57,25         
1886 71,01 28,99         
1890 68,12 31,88         
1892 60,53 39,47         
1894 67,11 11,18 17,76       
1898 73,68 8,55 17,76     0,66 
1900  56,58 22,37 20,39     1,32 
1904 56,63 25,30 17,47     0,00 
1908 47,56 21,95 15,24 0,00   0,00 
1910 51,19 21,43 14,88     0,00 
1912 54,30 11,29 9,68       
1914 46,59 22,73 29,55       
1919 37,63 18,28 37,63 2,69   0,00 
1921 37,63 17,74 36,56 2,15     
1925 43,88 11,73 40,31 3,06   1,02 
1929 39,23 15,47 38,67 6,08   0,55 
1932 42,25 12,83 39,04 4,28   1,60 
1936 30,20 11,39 34,65 7,92   4,46 
1939 33,17 16,34 31,68 8,42   4,46 
1946 45,54 7,92 32,67     11,39 
1949 49,53 13,68 31,13 0,00   5,66 
1950 50,94 9,43 34,43     3,30 
1954 44,81 11,32 38,68 0,00   1,89 
1958 49,06 9,43 37,74 0,47   0,94 
1961 45,28 9,43 39,62 2,36   2,36 
1965 36,32 22,64 30,19 7,08   2,83 
1968 32,55 22,17 27,83 15,09   2,36 
1971 25,94 14,15 26,89 21,23   4,25 
1974 33,96 14,15 27,83 22,17   0,94 
1977 37,74 15,57 28,77 16,51 0,00 0,94 
1978 38,68 17,45 27,36 14,15 0,00 1,89 
1981 28,77 24,53 28,77 13,68 1,89 0,94 
1985 32,55 21,70 31,60 9,43 4,25 0,00 
1987 29,25 22,64 33,96 9,91 4,25 0,00 
1991 26,89 21,70 29,72 12,26 8,02 0,00 
1995 27,33 26,00 27,33 12,00 7,33 0,00 
1999 21,33 27,33 22,00 16,00 13,33 0,00 
2003 19,33 32,67 32,00 13,33 2,67 0,00 
2007 26,67 27,33 22,67 12,00 8,00 0,00 
2010 17,33 20,67 26,00 26,00 8,67 0,00 
Note: missing values indicate that the party/-ies did not participate in the election. Zero (0,00) percentages indicate the party has a 
relevant electoral based but did not win a seat in the respective election. Green shades indicate the largest of the five traditional 
and modern party families. 
*Except for the thirty years in between 1965 and 1995 the parliamentary representation of the regionalist faction was prior to 1965 for 
100% and after 1995 for at least 90% determined by the Flemish nationalist parties (Frontpartij, KVNV, VNV, VU, VB, N-
VA) and for the remainder by the francophone regionalist parties (FDF, RW and FN). Cursive numbers: The golden age of the 
Walloon regionalism is the era between 1968 and 1981 when seat shares varied between 3,77% (1981, eight seats) and 11,79% 
(1971, 25 seats).  
 
